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This article was authored by Wade Horn and Andrew
Bush in 1997 for the Hudson Institute and updated for republishing
in 2000 prior to Wade's confirmation and prior to Andrew Bush taking
his job with the department of Health and Human Services. The Acton
Institute apologizes for inadvertently omitting this identifying
information.
With the passage of the historic welfare reform
legislation in 1996, America embarked on a dramatic new course in
providing assistance to our nation’s poorest families. These
federal welfare reforms altered both the purpose and form of the
nation’s principal cash assistance program, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC). Now retitled Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF), welfare no longer serves as a long-term
replacement for parents’ earnings. Instead, aid is now supposed
to be used to promote long-term self-sufficiency. The law also gives
states the responsibility for determining virtually all the standards
and requirements for their TANF programs. With the passage of this
legislation, the opportunity for revolutionary reform had never
been greater.
To date, reforms have focused almost exclusively
on welfare-to-work strategies. The results of these efforts have
been impressive. Nationally, caseloads have dropped by nearly 50
percent, as millions of previously welfare-dependent heads of households
have successfully entered the paid labor force. But if America is
to succeed in this grand new experiment, the promotion of work among
welfare recipients will need to take a smaller role in the next
phase of welfare reform. Despite being viewed primarily as a poverty
issue, welfare stands at the center of a broader social conflagration
that is even more profound than the vital issue of economic self-reliance:
the demise of marriage and the increasing disappearance of fathers
from families.
Families are the primary institutions through which
we protect and nurture our children, and upon which free societies
depend for establishing social order and promoting individual liberty
and fulfillment. Over the past several decades, however, the United
States has experienced both a dramatic decline in the institution
of marriage and a lack of reliance on two-parent families to rear
children. Even more precisely, we have been experiencing a decline
of fatherhood, because when marriages fail, or when children are
born out of wedlock and two-parent families never form, it is almost
always the fathers who are absent. The absence of fathers has, in
turn, severely increased the life risks faced by their children.
As state and federal officials laud the success
of replacing welfare with work, they must not lose sight of the
larger issues of fatherhood and marriage. Rather than simply help
single-parent households generate earnings in the absence of fathers,
state reforms also must find ways to bring more fathers into the
lives of their children. At the least, this requires addressing
the ability of fathers to support their children financially. But
the importance of fathers extends beyond economics, of course. Their
involvement as nurturers, disciplinarians, teachers, coaches, and
moral instructors is also critically important to the healthy development
and maturation of their children.
Given the importance of fathers, the next phase
of welfare reform must advance policies that encourage secure marriages
and make out-of-wedlock childbearing and single parenting less frequent.
This is not to say that all fathers are good for their children
or that all marriages should be saved. Separations, and even divorce,
are sometimes necessary, but despite this, the trend toward fatherlessness
must be reversed, and welfare reform can be instrumental in doing
that.
The problem is that strategies for promoting fatherhood
and marriage are, to some extent, in conflict with those that seek
to help single mothers achieve self-sufficiency through work. Indeed,
a welfare system that helps single mothers become employed but ignores
the need to promote fatherhood and marriage may serve only to enable
unmarried women to rear children without the presence of the father.
Yet, despite increasing public concern about the problems of out-of-wedlock
childbearing and the absence of fathers, most welfare reform efforts
to date have focused almost exclusively on moving unwed mothers
into the paid labor force.
Part of the reason for the current focus on welfare-to-work
strategies is that we know much more about promoting work than we
do about helping couples to form and sustain healthy, mutually satisfying
marriages. Moreover, marriage is something about which Americans
are considerably ambivalent. Because fatherhood and marriage frequently
touch upon difficult, painful, and highly personal decisions, policymakers
have been reluctant to address them through public policy reforms.
In addition, the awful specter of domestic violence has led some
to conclude that marriage is a trap for women. Consequently, welfare
reform efforts rarely have included policies to promote marriage.
Instead, most efforts have proceeded with what many proponents concede
is ultimately a secondary but attainable strategy: improving the
way in which we help single parents in their struggle for self-sufficiency.
One way to resolve these often-contentious issues
is to understand that efforts to increase workforce attachment,
increase marriage rates, decrease out-of-wedlock childbearing, and
increase father involvement are not goals in themselves; rather,
they are means for achieving welfare’s historic, and, we believe,
most important, goal: improving the well-being of children. This
does not mean that moving single mothers into the paid labor force,
increasing marriage rates, reducing illegitimacy, or increasing
father involvement are unimportant. To the contrary, each is vitally
important if we are to fundamentally reform a system that has trapped
too many families and children in long-term dependence. Each, however,
should be viewed more properly as an intervening or process variable
that may or may not ultimately improve the well-being of children.
Indeed, by focusing on improving the well-being of children, efforts
to promote work, marriage, and fatherhood need not be viewed as
working at cross-purposes.
Of course, welfare reform cannot, by itself, solve
the problems of fatherlessness and marriage any more than it alone
will ever solve the problems of poverty. So much depends on both
individual choices and broad societal and cultural influences. Nonetheless,
welfare policy can substantially influence the decisions that people
make and how they think about their life choices. The purpose of
this essay is to challenge states to develop integrated strategies
for promoting work, fatherhood, and marriage within the context
of welfare reform policies that will improve the lives of needy
families and their children. This objective must be an important
focus of the next phase of welfare reform.
Children in America Today
By most measures, children are only slightly better
off today compared with four decades ago. Today, one in six American
children under the age of eighteen lives in poverty.1 Overall, nearly
twelve million children reside in poor families.2 In fact, the percentage
of American children growing up within poor families today is higher
than the percentage growing up within poor families in 1966, the
year after President Johnson declared the War on Poverty.3
Unfortunately, many children today are not only
poor but also poorly educated. Almost 40 percent of 1992 high school
graduates did not possess the skills and basic knowledge required
either for college or for many entry-level jobs.4 Eighty percent
of seventeen-year-olds lack proficient writing skills.5 Fewer than
half can understand complicated high school literacy passages or
evaluate the results of a scientific study.6 Only 60 percent of
seventeen-year-olds can compute with decimals, fractions, and percents
or solve simple math equations.7 Approximately 3.8 million sixteen-
to twenty-four-year-olds—just over one in ten—have dropped
out of school, including 7.3 percent of white, 12.6 percent of black,
and 28.6 percent of Hispanic sixteen- to twenty-two-year-olds.8
Children today also are increasingly likely to
be the victims of violence. Between 1976 and 1989, reports of child
abuse and neglect rose 259 percent.9 According to one recent survey,
14 percent of boys and 20 percent of girls in the sixth through
twelfth grades reported having been hit or physically harmed by
a parent or other adult, causing them to have a scar, black and
blue mark, welt, bleeding, or a broken bone. Eighteen percent of
the girls in the survey reported that someone had sexually abused
them.10
If these statistics were not disturbing enough,
children today also are increasingly likely to inflict violence
upon themselves. Between 1960 and 1998, the teenage suicide rate
increased from 3.6 per one hundred thousand to 11.1 per one hundred
thousand, while the suicide rate for adults twenty-five years and
older remained approximately the same.11
Children today are also more likely than their
counterparts of just four decades ago to engage in early and promiscuous
sexual activity. Each year, one in ten girls under the age of twenty—over
one million annually—becomes pregnant.12 About two-thirds
of these pregnant teens carry their babies to term, resulting in
almost five hundred thousand live births.13 And nearly eight of
every ten births to teenagers are out of wedlock.14 Additionally,
each year, three million teenagers contract sexually transmitted
diseases.15
These statistics paint a grim picture of childhood
today. Certainly, there are many reasons for the decline in the
well-being of children in America, but two factors stand out above
the rest: (1) the dramatic increase in the proportion of children
growing up in fatherless households and (2) the rise of the modern
welfare system.
Fatherlessness in America
Arguably, the most consequential trend of our time
is the dramatic increase in the number of children growing up in
fatherless households. In 1960, the total number of children in
the United States living without their biological fathers was less
than ten million. Today, that number is twenty-three million.16
One-third of children in America do not live in the same homes as
their biological fathers. According to some estimates, that percentage
may have risen to 60 percent of children born in the 1990s.17
For nearly one million children each year, the
pathway to a fatherless family is divorce.18 The divorce rate nearly
tripled from 1960 to 1980, before leveling off and declining slightly
in the 1980s.19 Today, forty out of every one hundred first marriages
end in divorce, compared to sixty out of every one hundred first
marriages in 1960. No country has a higher divorce rate than the
United States.20
The second pathway to a fatherless family is out-of-wedlock
fathering. In 1960, about 5 percent of all births were out of wedlock.
That number increased to 10.7 percent in 1970, 18.4 percent in 1980,
28 percent in 1990, and 33 percent today.21 On an annual basis,
the number of children fathered out of wedlock now surpasses the
number of children whose parents divorce.22
Between 1980 and 1990, the percentage of live births
to unmarried women (the non-marital birth ratio) increased in each
of the fifty states.23 During this time period, ten states saw the
non-marital birth ratio increase by over 60 percent. Furthermore,
although the absolute number of births to unmarried teenagers has
declined in recent years, the percentage of teenagers who give birth
out of wedlock increased by 38 percent between 1985 and 1999. In
fact, 79 percent of all births to teenagers nationwide are now out
of wedlock.24
African Americans are disproportionately affected
by the problem of father absence. Fifty-six percent of African-American
children live in father-absent homes, but fatherlessness is by no
means restricted to African Americans. Indeed, the absolute number
of father-absent families is larger—and the rate of father
absence is growing the fastest—in the white community. Currently,
over 15 million white children reside in father-absent homes, compared
to approximately 7.7 million African-American children.25
The absence of fathers in the home has profound
consequences for children. Almost 75 percent of American children
living in single-parent families will experience poverty before
they turn eleven years old, compared to only 20 percent of children
in two-parent families.26 Children who grow up without fathers also
are more likely to fail at school or to drop out,27 experience behavioral
or emotional problems requiring psychiatric treatment,28 engage
in early sexual activity,29 and develop drug and alcohol problems.30
Fatherless children are at especially high risk
for committing or being the victims of violence. Males who grow
up without fathers—compared to those who grow up with fathers
in the home—are significantly more likely to commit rape,31
to be charged as adolescents with murder,32 and to be sentenced
to juvenile reform institutions.33 Children who grow up without
fathers also are significantly more likely to commit suicide as
adolescents34 and to be victims of child abuse or neglect.35
In light of these data, noted developmental psychologist
Urie Bronfenbrenner draws this conclusion:
Controlling for factors such as low income, children growing
up in [father-absent] households are at a greater risk for experiencing
a variety of behavioral and educational problems, including extremes
of hyperactivity and withdrawal; lack of attentiveness in the
classroom; difficulty in deferring gratification; impaired academic
achievement; school misbehavior; absenteeism; dropping out; involvement
in socially alienated peer groups; and the so-called “teenage
syndrome” of behaviors that tend to hang together—smoking,
drinking, early and frequent sexual experience, and in the more
extreme cases, drugs, suicide, vandalism, violence, and criminal
acts.36
There are, of course, many reasons for the growing
problem of fatherlessness in America. The transformation from an
agrarian to a modern industrialized society separated fathers from
the home for extended periods of time, leading some to view the
contributions of fathers to their families as primarily, if not
exclusively, economic. In addition, both the sexual revolution of
the 1960s and the more radical elements of the feminist movement
sought to decouple childbearing from the institution of marriage.
Moreover, over the past several decades the media has dramatically
changed its portrayal of fathers from wise, central figures in the
lives of families to bumbling buffoons or worse.37 As important
as each of these causes may be, much of the blame for fatherlessness,
especially among the poor, can be placed squarely on the development
of welfare policy over the past few decades.
The Roots of Welfare
Welfare—along with the nature of its relationship
to families—is by no means a concern addressed only by modern
policymakers. The roots of American public welfare laws go back
to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. Beginning with the
New Deal legislation of the 1930s, however, welfare policies in
the United States—and the ideas that underlie them—have
become distinct from the tradition out of which they grew. In developing
a plan for the new direction of welfare policy, policymakers ought
to know something about the evolution of welfare policy, especially
in terms of its relationship to fathers and families.
For much of the early history of England, providing
for the impoverished and needy was left up to individuals, churches,
and monasteries under what were known as the English poor laws.
As summarized and codified in 1601 during the forty-third parliament
of Queen Elizabeth, four major principles underlie these early English
poor laws. First, welfare was defined, at least in part, as a public
responsibility, and designated officials, called overseers of the
poor, were charged with the duty to assist the impoverished. Second,
welfare was to be administered as a local responsibility. Each parish
congregation was held responsible for its poor. If members of the
parish became needy elsewhere, the parish of origin was required
to receive them back and provide for their welfare. Third, the primary
responsibility for taking care of the poor was to be shouldered
as a family responsibility. A parish did not have to provide for
a poor family or individual if there were parents, grandparents,
adult children, or grandchildren who could do so. Fourth, the poor
were seen as having a personal responsibility to try to help themselves.
Overseers of the poor, therefore, were authorized to put them to
work, reflecting the belief that people ought to support themselves
insofar as they were able and ought neither to live in idleness
nor to beg from those who did work.38
Colonial America borrowed heavily from the English
poor laws. For much of the early history of America, people were
expected to look out for themselves and their families. If a family
became destitute, it was to turn first to relatives or neighbors
for support. If these informal sources of support proved inadequate,
the community was morally and, in some cases, legally obligated
to provide for the family through the poor laws. Public officials
might, for example, give an allowance or arrange to pay the family’s
bills at the local store. Or, if a family was unable to care for
itself or needed supervision (as in the case of the mentally ill),
the overseer might place them into the home of a functional family
and pay their host for the service. But officials also were justified
in seeing that individuals or members of the family did not evade
their own responsibilities; therefore, they required work in exchange
for aid and compelled financial support from relatives.39
Thus, well into the twentieth century, the provision
of public welfare was seen as a local or state responsibility, with
financial aid for dependent children primarily designed to help
widows and abandoned mothers stay out of the paid labor force. There
is little evidence that there was much public sentiment to provide
financial aid to never-married mothers. Indeed, the historical record
suggests that never-married mothers were routinely stigmatized;
moreover, if they were destitute, their dependent children were
placed in foster homes or orphanages.
AFDC and the Emergence of the Modern Welfare System
The seeds of the modern welfare system were sown
during the Great Depression. Not only did that period give birth
to what was to become the AFDC program, but the Great Depression
also changed how large parts of American society began to view public
programs and expectations for family and local self-sufficiency.
As the nation struggled to cope with the Great
Depression, an economic emergency of unprecedented breadth and longevity
(unemployment rose from 1.6 million in 1929 to a high of 12.8 million
in early 1933—25 percent of the labor force),40 it experimented
with new ideas about the role of the federal government in the provision
of welfare. This experimentation ultimately resulted in the enactment
of the Social Security Act of 1935, through which the federal government
began to try to ensure economic security for several demographic
groups of American families.
Of particular interest are the provisions in Title
IV-A of the Social Security Act for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).
Essentially, Title IV-A was an expansion of earlier widows’
pension programs established by most states during the early 1900s.
Advocates for the federal ADC program frequently emphasized that
these cash subsidies were to go primarily to widows so they could
stay home with their children and remain out of the paid labor market.
As long as welfare was directed toward this population—the
so-called deserving poor—there was little public dissatisfaction
with ADC.41
The early years of ADC also emphasized the responsibility
of families as the primary suppliers of financial aid. In fact,
as late as 1937, two-thirds of the states had provisions requiring
that, before relief could be given, relatives with “sufficient
ability” were to be called upon to support poor persons and
were subject to prosecution if they refused.
Although the architects of ADC intended the program
primarily to aid widows, they did not restrict eligibility to this
population. Instead, eligibility was defined in terms of children
deprived of the financial support of the head of the household.
As a result, ADC rolls quickly expanded to include mothers and children
who were commonly thought to be less deserving because the parents
were divorced or because the fathers had never married the mothers.
Moreover, while benefits under the ADC program
increased over time, cash benefits for unemployed heads of households
did not keep pace. Hence, a disparity arose between the amount of
financial assistance that father-absent families could receive through
ADC and the amount that families with an unemployed but present
father could receive. The confluence of these two developments resulted
in increasing public concern that fathers who could not find work
might do better financially by deserting their families so that
their wives and children could receive ADC benefits, with their
higher levels of financial assistance, rather than rely on the lower
benefit levels of unemployment compensation.
As a result of these concerns, Title IV-A was amended
in 1950 to require ADC eligibility workers to obtain information
from mothers about deserting fathers and to give this information
to the local district attorney. The district attorney would then
be charged with the responsibility to seek, through legal means,
financial support from the father. This system came to be known
as child support enforcement. This quickly led to unannounced inspections
of the home, even “midnight raids,” to reassure officials
that the mothers were, in fact, deserted and that there was no “man
in the house.”42
Despite these efforts, the 1960s saw increasing
public concern over the growth in ADC rolls. In response, cash welfare,
since renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
was expanded to include situations in which the father was unemployed
but had a work history. This would end, some believed, the incentive
for fathers to desert their families in order to get them into the
ADC program. To reflect this policy change, the AFDC program was
expanded to include, at state option, the AFDC-UP (or unemployed
parent) program. Nevertheless, AFDC rolls continued to rise, increasing
from 4.3 million in 1965 to 10.8 million in 1974, even though the
number of poor persons during this time period actually declined.43
A variety of factors likely contributed to this
growth in the AFDC caseload. In particular, a welfare rights movement
emerged that sought both to erase the stigma associated with welfare
receipt and to ensure that all potential recipients were treated
fairly. By the early 1970s, welfare benefits were being touted as
a right to which there should be few, if any, exclusions. This likely
contributed to a higher proportion of eligible families drawing
benefits, while converting welfare into a system that increasingly
protected recipients from interference by welfare officials. Eventually,
the operations of welfare departments became heavily regulated and
focused almost exclusively on benefit determination and distribution.
At the same time, welfare rules continued to discourage
the presence of a father in the home by encouraging, or at least
enabling, mothers to give birth out of wedlock. Although welfare
researchers disagree as to the magnitude of the effect, a substantial
body of literature documents a connection between welfare benefit
levels and the propensity to give birth out of wedlock. Research
by M. Anne Hill and June O’Neill, for example, demonstrates
that even after the variables of income, parental education, and
socioeconomic status are held constant, a 50 percent increase in
the monthly value of AFDC and food stamp benefits results in a 43
percent increase in the number of out-of-wedlock births.44 Similarly,
research by Mark A. Fossett and K. Jill Kiecolt found that an increase
of one hundred dollars in the average monthly AFDC benefit per recipient
child led to a drop of over 15 percent in marital births among African-American
women aged twenty to twenty-four.45 Indeed, C. R. Winegarden of
the University of Toledo estimates that fully half of the increase
in out-of-wedlock births among African Americans in recent decades
can be attributed to the effects of welfare.46
Receiving welfare is associated not only with higher
rates of out-of-wedlock births but also with lower marriage rates
after a woman bears a child out of wedlock. Using a nationally representative,
longitudinal sample, researchers Jodi R. Sandfort and Martha S.
Hill of the University of Michigan found that the higher the cash
welfare benefits provided to unwed mothers, the lower the probability
that an unwed mother would get married after the birth of her child.
Furthermore, unwed mothers who subsequently got married were significantly
more likely to attain self-sufficiency than those who did not. Specifically,
unwed mothers who eventually married had significantly higher annual
family incomes ($16,191 versus $6,344) and were less likely to be
living in poverty (39 percent versus 68 percent), compared with
those who did not marry. Thus, as cash welfare increases, the odds
decrease that an unmarried mother will ever marry; this, in turn,
decreases the prospect that an unwed mother will escape welfare.47
By implicitly encouraging out-of-wedlock births
and discouraging marriage, welfare has had the unintended effect
of increasing fatherlessness among the nation’s poor. Indeed,
roughly 90 percent of all families currently receiving cash welfare
do not have fathers living in the home.48 As documented earlier,
this increase in fatherlessness has contributed to the decline in
the well-being of children residing in low-income households.
Welfare Reform and Its Potential
After many years of tinkering with the AFDC program,
Congress enacted the Personal Re-sponsibility and Work Opportunities
Act in 1996, significantly altering both the underlying purpose
of public aid and the way in which it is administered. At the act’s
core was a philosophical shift that viewed cash assistance as a
temporary means through which low-income families could achieve
self-sufficiency. Under this legislation, recipients are permitted
to draw federal benefits for no more than five years; moreover,
they must be engaged in work activities within two years. Notably,
the entitlement to benefits under federal law was eliminated, and
AFDC was replaced with a block grant to states called Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
Welfare reform posed a historic opportunity for
states to reassess their goals for public assistance and to decide
how they wanted to use welfare funding to achieve those goals. Federal
funds no longer needed to be used for cash benefits; states could
spend the funds on services and subsidies to help families strengthen
their commitments to work and to their children. Subsequently, the
new federal law and discussions surrounding it have focused on work,
and state programs are now built around promoting employment.
Although the public paid little attention to welfare
reform’s emphasis on unwed parenting, reversing the tide of
fatherlessness was, indeed, a central concern of federal reform.
In fact, the opening passages of the bill that established TANF
addressed the need to promote marriage and responsible fatherhood.
Federal legislators clearly felt that reforms should help to promote
stable two-parent families. While few provisions in that law specifically
addressed family structure, the bill did include a twenty-million-dollar
bonus program for states that reduced out-of-wedlock births without
increasing the number of abortions.
Thus far, most states have launched comprehensive
reforms designed to replace welfare with work, but they need to
do much more than simply implement tougher work requirements. States
should use the opportunity afforded them by federal welfare reform
to construct entire new systems of aid, with a goal of not only
increasing work effort but also promoting responsible fatherhood
and marriage. Such changes are necessary not only because they will
save the taxpayers money but also because the system we have created
has been disastrous for children.
Bringing Fathers Back into the Picture
Since the 1950s, welfare’s focus on fathers
has been limited primarily to paternity establishment and child
support enforcement. Of course, any man who fathers a child ought
to be held financially responsible for that child, but there are
several reasons that child support enforcement alone is unlikely
to substantially improve the well-being of children.
First, establishing paternity does not guarantee
that children will receive support. In fact, only one in four single
women with children living below the poverty line receives support
from the non-custodial father.49 Some unwed fathers, especially
in low-income communities, may lack the financial resources to provide
economically for their children. For these men, establishing paternity
and receiving a child support order may not translate into economic
support for their children.
Lack of earnings, however, is not the only explanation
for the low rate of child support. Although studies show a substantial
range of incomes, the average child on cash welfare has a father
who earns approximately fifteen thousand dollars in annual income,
which indicates some ability to pay child support.50 Even though
unwed fathers can often afford to pay, many do not. Although precise
data are not available, reasons frequently cited for lack of payment
include parental conflict, substance abuse, remarriage, and simple
lack of interest in the welfare of the child or mother.
Second, even if paternity establishment were to
lead to a child support award, the average level of child support
(about $3,500 per year)51 is unlikely to move large numbers of children
out of poverty. Some may move out of poverty at the margins, but
without changes in family structure, moving from poverty to near-poverty
is not associated with significant improvements in child outcomes.52
Third, an exclusive emphasis on child support enforcement
may drive low-income fathers further away from their children. As
word circulates within low-income communities that cooperating with
paternity establishment but failing to comply with child support
orders may result in imprisonment or revocation of one’s driver’s
license, many fathers may simply choose to become less involved
with their children. Therefore, the unintended consequence of such
policies may be a decrease, rather than an increase, in the number
of children growing up with involved fathers, proving once again
that no good policy goes unpunished.
Finally, an over-emphasis on child support enforcement
ignores the many non-economic contributions of fathers to the well-being
of their children. Although providing economic support is certainly
important, it is neither the only nor the most important role that
fathers play. Indeed, emphasizing fatherhood in largely economic
terms may have helped to contribute to its demise. After all, if
fathers are little more than paychecks to their children, they can
easily be replaced by welfare payments. If we want fathers to be
more than just money machines to their children, we need a public
policy that supports their work as nurturers, disciplinarians, mentors,
moral instructors, and skill coaches, not just economic providers.
If paternity establishment and child support enforcement
alone are not the answer, then what is? All available evidence suggests
that the most effective pathway to involved, committed, and responsible
fatherhood is marriage. Research has consistently found that unmarried
fathers, whether through divorce or out-of-wedlock fathering, tend,
over time, to become disconnected, both financially and psychologically,
from their children. About 40 percent of children in father-absent
homes have not seen their fathers in at least a year. Of the remaining
60 percent, only one in five sleeps even one night per month in
his or her father’s home. Overall, only one in six sees his
or her father an average of one or more times per week.53 More than
half of all children who do not live with their fathers have never
even been in their fathers’ homes.54
Unwed fathers are particularly unlikely to stay
connected to their children over time. Whereas 57 percent of unwed
fathers are visiting their children at least once per week during
the first two years of their children’s lives, by the time
their children reach seven-and-a-half years of age, that number
drops to less than 25 percent.55 Approximately 75 percent of men
who are not living with their children at the time of their birth
do not, ever, subsequently live with them.56 Even when unwed fathers
are cohabitating with the mothers at the time of their children’s
birth, they are unlikely to stay involved in their children’s
lives over the long term. Although a quarter of non-marital births
occur to cohabitating couples, six out of ten cohabitating couples
never go on to marry, and those who do are more likely to divorce
than those couples who bear children within marriage.57 Remarriage,
or, in the case of an unwed father, marriage to someone other than
the child’s mother, makes it especially unlikely that a non-custodial
father will remain in contact with his child.58
The inescapable conclusion is this: If we want
to increase the proportion of children growing up with involved
and committed fathers, we will have to increase the number of children
living with their married fathers. Unmarried men—especially
unwed fathers—are simply unlikely to stay in contact with
their children over the long term.
Interestingly, not only does marriage dramatically
increase the likelihood that a child will grow up with a father,
but it also has a significant positive effect on the earnings of
the father. According to research by Robert Lerman, young, unwed
fathers who later married boosted their annual earnings from about
$7,400 to $17,700. In contrast, those who remained unwed fathers
saw much less income growth, from $5,500 to $10,500.59 Given the
connections between marriage, father involvement, and earnings,
the most effective means for improving the income security of children
is not child support but marriage.
Unfortunately, welfare frequently operates to punish
marriage. According to calculations by Eugene Steuerle of the Urban
Institute, when a man working full time at a minimum-wage job marries
a mother on welfare with two children, the new family’s combined
earnings plus benefits would be $3,862 less than if the couple did
not marry and the woman stayed on welfare.60 (This hardly provides
an incentive for marriage.) In part, this financial penalty is due
to welfare rules, but it is also due to marriage penalties inherent
in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which can cause low-income
parents who marry to lose as much as $5,000 annually. There also
are instances where non-cash benefits, such as public housing subsidies,
are withdrawn or substantially reduced, should a welfare recipient
marry. The essential message that welfare sends to single mothers
is this: If you want your welfare benefits to continue, do not marry
an employed man.
In addition, federal rules have historically operated
to make it more, not less, difficult for married, two-parent families
to receive cash welfare, in comparison with single-parent families.
First, the one-hundred-hour rule in the Unemployed Parent (UP) program
dictated that a two-parent family—but not a single-parent
family—lost eligibility for cash welfare if the principal
wage earner was employed for one hundred hours a month or more,
even if the family’s wages from employment were so low that
the family would still be financially eligible for cash assistance.
Second, UP program rules did not allow a two-parent family to receive
aid until thirty days after the principal wage earner had become
unemployed—a waiting period that was not required for single-parent
households. Third, the UP program rules required that two-parent
families, but not single-parent families, demonstrate a “connection
to the work force,” typically defined as having had at least
fifty dollars of earnings in at least six of thirteen quarters before
applying for cash welfare.
Making matters worse, there is evidence that the
availability of cash welfare can have a destabilizing effect on
marriage. Mary Jo Bane and David Elwood, for example, calculated
that for mothers under the age of twenty-four, a one-hundred-dollar
increase in welfare benefits increases the number of divorced and
separated mothers by as much as 50 percent.61 Indeed, Stacy Dickert-Conlin
of the University of Kentucky estimates that cutting the marriage
penalty in half for couples facing the largest reductions in income
would reduce the likelihood of annual separations by 36 percent.62
Of course, not all marriages between biological
parents are ideal. Domestic violence and other irreconcilable differences
will, at times, create single-parent families. The reality is that
some men are lousy and even abusive husbands and fathers. It is
not, therefore, our view that either the ideal divorce rate or the
ideal out-of-wedlock birth ratio ought to be zero. But neither should
the divorce rate be 50 percent nor the out-of-wedlock birth ratio
33 percent.
Therefore, while acknowledging the reality of domestic
violence and accepting the inevitability of some divorces and even
out-of-wedlock childbearing, states need to pursue a pro-marriage
welfare reform strategy. As pointed out by Senator Hillary Clinton,
every society, in order to function well, requires a critical mass
of married, two-parent families to raise their own children well
and to serve as models for those who are being reared in something
other than a married, two-parent family.63 The great tragedy today
is that there are communities—especially low-income communities—that
have already lost that critical mass. What we need now is a transformation
of welfare—from a system that is biased against fathers and
marriage to one that actively promotes responsible fatherhood and
marriage. But how to do this remains a question.
The Next Phase of Welfare Reform: Recommendations
for a Pro-Work, Pro-Marriage, and Pro-Father Welfare Policy
Recommendation One: Make welfare policies explicitly
pro-marriage
Out-of-wedlock childbearing has become the most
common route to welfare.64 Conversely, the most common route off
of welfare is work. Kathleen Mullan Harris of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill found that two-thirds of all monthly
exits from welfare were due to a new job or a pay increase in an
existing job, compared with only 5 percent that were due to marriage.
However, most of the women who exited welfare due to increased earnings
returned to the welfare rolls relatively quickly.65
The next most common route off of welfare is marriage.
Indeed, those who exit welfare through marriage are less likely
to return within a year than those who exit welfare because of work
(33 percent versus 39 percent).66 Therefore, marriage is at least
as important a mechanism for escaping welfare as work is. Given
that marriage also provides a father for the children, it will likely
be more effective at improving the well-being of children than will
a simple increase in workforce participation by single mothers.
Many argue that marriage is a matter of the heart
and, as such, is impervious to legislation or financial incentives.
But research has found that financial incentives can—and do—influence
decisions about whether to get married. For example, research by
Shelly Lundberg and Robert Plotnick found that as a state’s
welfare benefits increased, the probability decreased that a white,
unmarried pregnant adolescent would get married before the birth
of her child. Specifically, these researchers found that in low-benefit
states, 65 percent of young women got married before the birth of
their children, compared with only 40 percent in high-benefit states.67
Given that marriage is the most effective long-term
escape from welfare dependence, states should make the following
changes in welfare policy to provide strong and unambiguous support
for marriage:
Eliminate systemic preferences that give advantages
to single-parent families over two-parent, married families.
As discussed earlier, the AFDC program had a variety of eligibility
rules that were more restrictive for two-parent, as compared to
single-parent, households, thereby creating disincentives for marriage.
In determining eligibility of families for welfare assistance, states
should eliminate the one-hundred-hour rule, the work history rules,
and the thirty-day waiting period, and should allow substantially
higher earnings and asset disregards for low-income, married couples
than for single-parent households. The good news is that a significant
number of states have already eliminated many of these anti-marriage
rules, especially the one-hundred-hour rule. Every state that has
not yet done so should aggressively move to change these onerous
provisions.
Require that participants be married, and not
just cohabitating, in order to qualify for two-parent family benefits.
Cohabitation is one of the fastest growing types of family situations.
Among adults aged twenty-five to thirty-four, the percentage of
cohabiting couples in which children were present increased from
34 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 1993. Overall, 3.3 million children
are members of cohabiting families.68
Research indicates that children living in cohabiting
families have lower academic performance and more school problems
than children living in married, two-parent families. In addition,
children in cohabiting families are more likely to be poor than
those in two-parent, married families, although they are less poor
than children living in single-parent households.69 For optimum
benefit, therefore, children need to be living with two married
parents, not merely with cohabiters. Given the poor outcomes associated
with cohabitation, incentives should be unambiguously in favor of
marriage, not cohabitation.
Take affirmative steps to enhance the marital
and parenting skills of high-risk families. Marriage alone is
not sufficient to improve the well-being of children. For marriages
to have a positive impact on the development of children, parents
must have the skills both to sustain a marriage and to be good parents.
Unfortunately, many men and women lack these necessary skills. Some
may have grown up in broken homes where they never experienced positive
marital role models. Others may have had inadequate or abusive parents.
To help couples sustain their marriages and rear their children
well, states should encourage religious and civic organizations
to offer parenting and marriage enrichment classes to mothers and
fathers applying for public assistance.
Recommendation Two: Increase the marriage potential
of low-income males by increasing their workforce attachment
When a family lacks a reliable wage earner, the
family is likely to be poor. Poverty, in turn, is associated with
poor developmental outcomes for children. A number of studies have
found that children living within poor families are significantly
more likely than non-poor children to develop emotional and behavioral
problems,70 underachieve at school,71 and live in poverty themselves
in adulthood.72
The absence of money, however, is not the most
important reason that poverty is associated with poor outcomes for
children. Living in poverty is highly correlated with living in
father-absent households. According to research by Victor Fuchs
and Diane Reklis, father-present households saw a steady rise in
income from 1960 to 1990, while father-absent households saw a decline
in income from 1980 to 1990.73 Indeed, the median family income
for a married couple with children is three times higher than it
is for a single-mother family—sixty thousand dollars a year
versus twenty thousand dollars a year.74 In fact, 31 percent of
divorced or separated mothers and 49 percent of never-married mothers—compared
to only 6 percent of two-parent families—live in poverty.75
Thus, much of the negative effect of low income on the well-being
of children is actually the result of the absence of fathers.
However, it is not merely low income but, rather,
welfare dependence that has the most deleterious effects on children.
For example, in a study of young boys growing up in families with
identical non-welfare incomes, Mary Corcoran and her colleagues
at the University of Michigan found that increases in income obtained
through welfare were correlated with lower earnings by the boys
upon their reaching adulthood. Indeed, an increase of one thousand
dollars per year in welfare received by the family was correlated
with a decrease of as much as 10 percent in a boy’s future
earnings.76
Girls also are negatively affected by receipt of
welfare. Research by economist John Pepper at the University of
Wisconsin at Madison showed that young women whose parents received
AFDC were themselves 25 percent more likely to be recipients of
cash welfare in adulthood, compared with young women who grew up
in poor families that did not receive cash welfare.77 Furthermore,
research by Margaret E. Ensminger found that, even after controlling
for other early life conditions, women who grew up in families that
received welfare, compared with those who did not, exhibited lower
self-esteem and were significantly more likely, as mothers of young
children, to report psychological distress.78
Perhaps most alarming of all is the fact that welfare
receipt, but not low-income alone, has been found to negatively
affect a child’s cognitive capacities. In an examination of
the IQs of young children who were long-term welfare dependents,
Anne Hill and June O’Neill of Queens College concluded, “Although
long-term welfare recipients are generally poor, persistent poverty
does not seem to be the main reason for the poor performance of
these children. Moreover, our analysis suggests that policies that
would raise the income of children on welfare simply by increasing
AFDC benefits are not likely to improve cognitive development.”79
Increasing the workforce attachment of parents
is likely to improve the well-being of children for several reasons.
First, work, even at low wage levels, increases the amount of earned
income available to families relative to welfare, while helping
parents develop the skills, habits, and contacts to find better
jobs and higher wages.
Second, when adult welfare recipients get jobs,
it provides their children with models of work. Children then learn
the behavioral skills necessary to get and keep jobs, such as regularly
and consistently going to work in the morning and being courteous
to one’s employer, fellow employees, and customers. Even more
important than passing along skills to their children, working parents
pass along an attitude about work and self-support that is critical
to avoiding dependence and poverty—the attitude that adults
should do their jobs well and stay employed, regardless of obstacles.
Third, as previously welfare-dependent parents
begin to exercise the responsibility of supporting themselves, they
are also more likely to exercise responsibility in other areas of
their lives, including parenting. Indeed, non-working mothers have
been found to be significantly less likely than employed mothers
to be highly involved in the educational activities of their children,
despite the fact that non-working mothers presumably have more time
available to spend at their children’s school.80Hence, increasing
workforce attachment is likely to increase parents’ commitment
to responsible and involved parenting as well.
Finally, the workplace is where large numbers of
people meet their future spouses. It is reasonable, therefore, to
expect that when single welfare mothers get jobs, their marriage
prospects will increase. Hence, one benefit of welfare-to-work strategies
is an increase in marriage rates for low-income women.
Increasing the workforce attachment of single mothers,
however, also has a downside. There is evidence that women—especially
women living in low-income communities—are reluctant to marry
men whose economic prospects are lower than their own. Hence, an
increase in the earnings of single mothers, especially in communities
with high rates of male unemployment, may inadvertently decrease
the probability that they will marry.81
Of course, few would argue that public policy should
aim to decrease the economic prospects of single women. At the same
time, however, one must take into account the reality that women
do not like to “marry down.” Thus, in order to reinstitute
marriage in low-income, welfare-dependent communities, states will
need to take the following steps:
Expand participation in welfare-to-work employment
programs to include low-income men. The emphasis on workforce
attachment and development that is the focus of welfare reform for
single mothers is needed for low-income males as well—not
only as a means to increase their own life prospects but also as
a means to increase their marriageability. In fact, research has
shown that the availability of suitable potential husbands for single
mothers on welfare had a greater effect on marriage rates and non-marital
fertility than AFDC benefit levels did.82 Consequently, states should
replace welfare for single mothers with a comprehensive system of
job preparation, placement, and retention services, and should offer
subsidies for all low-income adults who could benefit from them.
We do not recommend that welfare agencies finance
job training that is not well connected to employment. Rather, states
should use money formerly spent on benefits, education, and training
to finance services that help individuals find jobs and remain employed—including,
when feasible, employment subsidies and community service jobs for
those who cannot find unsubsidized work. The elements of this strategy
have already been developed in many states, but services now need
to be sewn together into a comprehensive replacement for welfare
that promotes successful workforce attachment for low-income women
and men.
An example of this can be seen in the Wisconsin
Works (W-2) program. W-2 ended unconditional benefit payments, instead
offering employment opportunities to able-bodied, low-income parents.
Job subsidies are available when needed, but assistance is oriented
toward helping parents secure employment. Eligibility is based on
income and resources, with no special benefits given to single parents.
With such eligibility rules and a focus on finding and securing
employment, W-2 provides needed opportunities to all low-income
families while conveying a consistent and important message: All
parents will be expected to support themselves and their families.
Public assistance under W-2 is intended, then, to be family assistance.
As such, it is oriented to include fathers as well as mothers and
to help stabilize families.
In expanding welfare-to-work employment programs
to low-income men, do not limit programs to unwed fathers. In
expanding employment services to low-income males, states should
not condition receipt of services upon being an unwed father. Doing
so would, in a strange way, introduce incentives for men to father
children out of wedlock, in much the same way that AFDC provided
incentives for women to bear children out of wedlock. Hence, access
to welfare-to-work services should extend not only to unwed fathers
but also to married fathers and even non-fathers.
Expanding job placement and supportive employment
services to the general population of low-income men may prove to
be an expensive proposition (although states such as Oregon and
Wisconsin have shown that it is possible to reform welfare, spend
money on hard-to-place recipients, and still save money). Consequently,
this recommendation should be undertaken only within the context
of a welfare system that has first systematically and unambiguously
instituted supports for marriage. Otherwise, we will succeed only
in implementing a massive jobs program, not in increasing the prevalence
of marriage or improving the well-being of children.
Recommendation Three: Increase the opportunity
costs for men who father children out of wedlock
Two of the most frequent pathways to welfare are
divorce and out-of-wedlock childbearing.83 Although the immediate
result is the same (i.e., the formation of a single-parent family),
the two situations are quite different. First, divorced mothers
are far more likely than unmarried mothers to receive formal child
support payments from the fathers. Second, divorced mothers spend
substantially less time on welfare than never-married mothers, primarily
because they are more likely to remarry than women who have children
out of wedlock.
The percentage of AFDC recipient children of never-married
parents rose steadily over the past several decades (from 27.9 percent
in 1969, to 44.3 percent in 1983, to 55.7 percent in 1994), while
the percentage of AFDC recipient children of divorced parents steadily
declined (from 43.3 percent in 1969, to 38.5 percent in 1979, to
only 26.5 percent in 1994).84
These statistics indicate that the most effective
strategy for fighting long-term welfare dependence is to reduce
the number of births to never-married women. While divorce certainly
has terrible consequences for children, it is substantially less
likely than an out-of-wedlock birth to lead to long-term welfare
dependence. Hence, while there may be many good reasons to work
toward reducing the divorce rate, reducing the number of children
born out of wedlock is a far more important strategy for reducing
long-term welfare dependence.
The evidence suggests that by increasing the opportunity
costs for out-of-wedlock childbearing, public policy can reduce
the number of children born out of wedlock. In 1992, for example,
New Jersey implemented a family cap provision, denying additional
cash benefits to women who conceived an additional child while on
welfare. Statewide, births to mothers on AFDC subsequently declined
by 4 percent between 1992 and 1994, compared with a 1.9 percent
decline in births to all mothers statewide. This post-reform decline
contrasts sharply with the 4.9 percent increase in births to mothers
on AFDC over the year preceding discussion of the family cap, when
birth rates to all mothers statewide were declining by 1.3 percent.
Interestingly, AFDC birth rates declined more significantly
in areas of the state where AFDC recipients were most highly concentrated.
Between 1992 and 1994, the ten New Jersey cities with the highest
AFDC rates saw birth rates to mothers on AFDC drop by 8.5 percent.
The largest city, Newark, experienced a decline of 10.4 percent
in births to mothers on AFDC. The state’s most welfare-dependent
city, Camden, saw a startling 21.2 percent decline in births to
mothers on AFDC.85 The lesson: Requiring parents to assume responsibility
for having children can have a significant impact on illegitimacy.
To date, most sanctions for out-of-wedlock childbearing
have focused on single mothers; however, to maximize the effectiveness
of such efforts, states should take steps to increase the opportunity
costs for men who father children out of wedlock:
Use public education campaigns and the “bully
pulpit” to communicate the need to delay fathering until marriage.
One of the reasons for the startling reduction in illegitimate births
in Camden, New Jersey, is the uncompromising moral rhetoric against
out-of-wedlock childbearing used by Wayne Bryant, a former leader
of the New Jersey State Assembly and a prominent voice in the African-American
community. His arguments, along with the considerable discussion
and debate that the family cap proposal generated statewide, were
likely important in conveying the message that mothers would be
held responsible for supporting the children they had out of wedlock.
There is no reason to believe that such an uncompromising moral
stand against fathering children out of wedlock would not have at
least some impact on the behavior of men as well.
Vigorously enforce the child support obligations
of men who father children out of wedlock. Although we have
criticized child support enforcement as the exclusive means for
addressing the importance of fathers in the lives of their children,
it can be an effective means for deterring out-of-wedlock fathering
when utilized as part of a larger strategy.
Restrict the ability of teenage boys to participate
in extra-curricular activities, especially sports, if they father
children out of wedlock. Since the 1972 passage of Title IX,
which prohibits discrimination in education programs and activities
receiving federal financial assistance, schools have been reluctant
to restrict students from participating in extracurricular activities
on the basis of childbearing. This has removed an effective means
of sanctioning out-of-wedlock childbearing, thereby also lessening
the stigma traditionally attached to it. State education agencies
should, therefore, encourage local education agencies and schools
to restrict participation in extracurricular activities for boys
who father children out of wedlock.
Pursue stricter enforcement of statutory rape
laws. Historically, statutory rape laws have served to protect
minors from sexual activity by setting an age—usually between
thirteen and sixteen years old—under which there is no possibility
of consensual sex. In the 1960s, however, state statutory rape laws
were changed to a two-tiered system. A younger age was typically
established, usually twelve or thirteen years old, under which consensual
sex was legally impermissible. A second age range, usually thirteen
through sixteen years old, was then established, allowing for consensual
sex with persons of similar age but not with persons four or five
years older than the minor. This change signaled that it was now
acceptable for teenagers to have sex with each other, but not with
older persons.
Given that two-thirds of all births to unwed teenage
women are fathered by men twenty years of age or older,86 states
should return to the historical idea of statutory rape and place
more effort on enforcing existing statutory rape laws. Although
we do not necessarily support jail terms for offenders, we do strongly
recommend that some consistent and sure sanction, such as a monetary
fine or loss of a driver’s license, be applied to men who
engage in sexual intercourse with teenage girls.
Recommendation Four: When births do occur out
of wedlock, do more to encourage adoption as a loving alternative
to abortion and single parenting
By most measures, children growing up in two-parent,
adoptive families fare as well as those growing up in two-parent,
biological families, and they fare significantly better than children
growing up in single-parent or stepparent families.87 Furthermore,
opinion surveys consistently find that, in cases of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies, the general public views adoption as a more attractive
option than either abortion or single parenting. Yet only 3 percent
of white women and 1 percent of African-American women who conceive
children out of wedlock choose adoption.88
Given that children in loving, adoptive, two-parent
households fare better than those reared in single-parent homes,
states should take the following steps to promote adoption as a
loving option when single women are confronted with out-of-wedlock
births:
Ensure that caseworkers present adoption as
a loving alternative to abortion and single parenting. Today,
adoption is too frequently seen as a failure of the “system”—a
last resort that should be chosen only after all other options have
been exhausted. If improving the well-being of children is the goal,
however, states ought to operate under the principle that adoption
is a loving option, not a sign of failure.
Aggressively publicize the advantages of adoption
as well as private-sector initiatives that help place children in
adoptive homes. The “One Church-One Child” campaign
sponsored through African-American churches has effectively increased
the number of minority children successfully placed for adoption.
States should highlight effective adoption programs such as this,
both to encourage more adoptions and to combat thepublic perception
that there are not enough potential adoptive parents.
Use welfare block grant funds to increase the
number of maternity homes available to unwed mothers who choose
adoption. Several decades ago, maternity homes for unwed, pregnant
girls were relatively common. With the advent of widespread access
to legal abortion, however, public support for maternity homes has
dwindled. One permissible use of the new federal welfare block grant
is to support adoption. Hence, states should consider using a portion
of their block grant funds to breathe life back into the network
of maternity homes.
Provide a clear and unambiguous preference for
married couples in the adoption process. If we wish to strengthen
marriage, it will be necessary to provide preferences for marriage
in every aspect of public policy, including adoption. Consequently,
whenever more than one potential adoptive home is available, preference
should be given to married couples.
Take affirmative steps to speed the adoption
of abandoned infants and chronically abused children. It is
a national disgrace that it takes so long to terminate the parental
rights of repeat child abusers and those who abandon their infants.
Rather than emphasize family preservation services in these circumstances,
states should hold child welfare agencies accountable for adhering
to strict timelines for decision making with regard to the termination
of parental rights. In addition, states should privatize adoption
placements when public child welfare agencies fail to proceed swiftly
enough.
Recommendation Five: Transform the child support
enforcement program into a father involvement program
In cases where adoption is rejected as an option,
the goal ought to be to ensure that the child has the benefit of
growing up with the love of both the mother and the father. To date,
most states have made paternity establishment and enforcement of
child support the focus of their efforts toward unwed fathers; however,
if the goal is for every child to have an engaged, responsible,
committed father, states should take the following steps to encourage
more involved fathering:
Alter priorities within the child support enforcement
program to promote not only financial responsibility but also father
involvement. One of the most promising programs for getting
unwed fathers to establish paternity and support their children
economically is run by the National Center for Responsible Fathering
and Child Development in Cleveland, Ohio. The strength of this program
is its focus on enhancing father-child ties, which takes precedence
over paternity establishments and child support. Experience from
this program suggests that as fathers become increasingly attached
to their children, their desire to claim the children as their own
and to care for them also increases.
Require custodial mothers to cooperate with
visitation enforcement as a condition of welfare receipt. For
too long, the child support enforcement system has treated fathers
merely as financial supporters for their children; however, this
approach ignores all of the contributions that fathers make to the
well-being of their children. Although this perspective is changing,
there continues to be a sense that the child is “owned”
by the mother and that the involvement of the father is largely
dependent on her goodwill. Making receipt of welfare conditioned
on cooperation with visitation orders can help reinforce the idea
that children belong to both parents.
Pass all child support payments directly to
the custodial parent, with none assigned to the state. Under
AFDC rules, only the first fifty dollars of a monthly child support
payment went directly to the mother; the rest went to the state
to reimburse it for the costs of AFDC. When such a small amount
of child support goes directly to the mother, there is an incentive
for her to keep the identity of the father secret if he is providing
more than fifty dollars a month in financial support under the table.
Under TANF, states now have the authority to change these rules
and allow all or most of the child support payments to be paid directly
to the custodial parents.
Experience in Wisconsin suggests that welfare recipients
who are made aware of the child support that is available to them
and who understand that it will not be taken away if they work are
more apt to find their way off of welfare. In particular, when all
child support was passed through in a demonstration project in Fond
du Lac County, recipients began to see that much of the support
they were receiving did not depend on their being on welfare, and
that by increasing their earnings they could leave welfare altogether.
Program administrators believe this led many recipients to increase
their work effort so they could escape welfare dependence.89
As an alternative to child support enforcement,
allow, or even require, unwed fathers to satisfy the welfare reform
work requirement while mothers care for the children. Fathers
who owe child support but are unable to pay could be offered the
opportunity to work in community service positions or be assisted
in finding jobs, as an alternative to jail. A number of states have
already implemented this plan, which not only increases the earnings
of the fathers so that they can help support their children financially
but also fosters a sense of interdependence between the mother and
the father.
Conclusion
Today, the greatest single threat to the long-term
well-being of our children and our communities is the increasing
number of children being raised without a responsible, loving father.
Our nation is known for its optimism and fondness for reforms that
promise to make society safer, stronger, and richer. Yet all the
social reforms we have attempted in the past, or may attempt in
the future, will likely pale in comparison to the good that would
come if we could turn back the tide of fatherlessness.
This tide will not be turned easily—and certainly
not by changes in public policy alone—but welfare policy can
have a significant effect on parents’ views of marriage and
family. Welfare policy in recent decades has systematically subsidized
single parenthood, serving to discourage many fathers from meeting
their responsibilities. Fortunately, the federal welfare law of
1996 has given states the opportunity to make revolutionary changes
in their systems of public aid.
As states proceed with their reforms, they should
keep in mind both the importance of fathers to the well-being of
their children and the fact that marriage is the most effective
route to increasing the number of children growing up with an involved,
loving father. In the past, states have concluded that promoting
responsible fatherhood is mostly about child support enforcement.
But, as this essay has shown, child support enforcement alone is
insufficient to ensure that every child grows up with a responsible
father.
Success in welfare reform will depend on the clarity
of our collective vision as to the ultimate purpose of the next
phase of welfare reform. If we focus exclusively on measures that
move single mothers into the paid labor force, we will have missed
the most important role of any legitimate welfare system—to
enhance the well-being of children. Simply put, children need their
fathers, and marriage helps men to be good fathers. Effective welfare
reform means encouraging both more work and more marriages.
Notes
- Joseph Dalaker and Bernadette D. Proctor, Poverty in the United
States (Washington, D.C.: Census Bureau, 2000), figure 3.
- Ibid., table A.
- Historical Poverty Tables: Poverty Status of People by Age,
Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959–1999 (Washington, D.C.:
Census Bureau, 2000), table 3.
- John G. Wirt et al., The Condition of Education: 2000 (Washington,
D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, 2000), table 30.1.
- Ibid., 24.
- J. R. Campbell, K. E. Voelkl, and P. L. Donahue, Trends in
Academic Progress(Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education
Statistics, 2000), table 5.1.
- Ibid., table 2.
- Phillip Kaufman et al., Dropout Rates in the United States:
1999 (Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics,
2000), table 3.
- Just the Facts: A Summary of Recent Information on America’s
Children and Their Families(Washington, D.C.: National Commission
on Children, 1993). It is unclear, however, the extent to which
the increase in reports of child abuse and neglect is due to actual
increases in the rate of child abuse and neglect, to increased
mandatory reporting requirements, to increases in false reporting,
or to some combination of these factors.
- Peter L. Benson, The Troubled Journey: A Portrait of Sixth-
and Twelfth-Grade Youth (Minneapolis, Minn.: Search Institute,
1993), 90.
- Sheryl Murphy, Deaths: Final Data for 1998 (Hyattsville, Md.:
National Center for Health Statistics, 2000), table 8; U.S. Children
and Their Families: Current Conditions and Recent Trends (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1989), 189.
- Alan Guttmacher Institute, Teenage Pregnancy: Overall Trends
and State-by-State Information (New York: AGI, 1999), table 1;
S. K. Henshaw, U.S. Teenage Pregnancy Statistics with Comparative
Statistics for Women Aged 20–24 (New York: AGI, 1999), 5.
- Kristen A. Moore et al., Facts at a Glance (Washington, D.C.:
Child Trends, 1999).
- Ibid.
- Alan Guttmacher Institute, Sex and America’s Teenagers
(New York: AGI, 1994), 38.
- Jason Fields, The Living Arrangements of Children: 1996
(Washington, D.C.: Census Bureau, 2001).
- Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., and Andrew J. Cherlin, Divided Families:
What Happens to Children When Parents Part (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1991).
- Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics: 1988 (Washington,
D.C.: National Center for Health Statistics, 1991).
- Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993 (Washington,
D.C.: Census Bureau, 1993).
- Just the Facts: A Summary of Recent Information on America’s
Children and Their Families (Washington, D.C.: National Commission
on Children, 1993).
- Stephanie Ventura and Christine Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing
in the United States, 1940–1999 (Hyattsville, Md.: National
Center for Health Statistics, 2000), table 4.
- Wade F. Horn, Father Facts 3 (Gaithersburg, Md.: National Fatherhood
Initiative, 1996), 20, 38.
- Stephanie Ventura, Christine Bachrach, Laura Hill, Kellenn
Kay, Pamela Holcomb, and Elisa Koff, “The Demography of
Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing,” in Report to Congress on Out-of-Wedlock
Childbearing (Washington, D.C.: Department of Health and Human
Services, 1995), 105.
- Stephanie Ventura and Christine Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing
in the United States, 1940–1999(Hyattsville, Md.: National
Center for Health Statistics, 2000), table 4.
- Jason Fields, The Living Arrangements of Children: 1996 (Washington,
D.C.: Census Bureau, 2001).
- Just the Facts: A Summary of Recent Information on America’s
Children and Their Families (Washington, D.C.: National Commission
on Children, 1993).
- Suet-Ling Pong and Dong-Beom Ju, “The Effects of Change
in Family Structure and Income on Dropping Out of Middle and High
School,” Journal of Family Issues 21 (2000): 147–169;
Debra Dawson, “Family Structure and Children’s Well-Being:
Data from the 1988 National Health Survey,” Journal of Marriage
and Family 53 (1991): 573–584; Survey of Child Health(Washington,
D.C.: National Center for Health Statistics, 1993).
- Andrew J. Cherlin, P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, and Christine
McRae, “Effects of Parental Divorce on Mental Health throughout
the Life Course,” American Sociological Review 63 (1998):
239–249; Taru Maekikyroe et al., “Hospital-Treated
Psychiatric Disorders in Adults with a Single-Parent and Two-Parent
Family Background,” Family Process 37 (1998): 335–344;
National Health Interview Survey (Hyattsville, Md.: National Center
for Health Statistics, 1988).
- Christina Lammers et al., “Influences on Adolescents’
Decision to Postpone Onset of Sexual Intercourse: A Survival Analysis
of Virginity among Youths Aged Thirteen to Eighteen Years,”
Journal of Adolescent Health 26 (2000): 42–48; Dawn M. Upchurch,
Carol S. Aneshensel, Clea A. Sucoff, and Lene Levy-Storms, “Neighborhood
and Family Contexts of Adolescent Sexual Activity,” Journal
of Marriage and the Family 61 (1999): 920–933.
- John P. Hoffmann and Robert A. Johnson, “A National Portrait
of Family Structure and Adolescent Drug Use,” Journal of
Marriage and the Family 60 (1998): 633–645; The Relationship
between Family Structure and Adolescent Substance Use (Washington,
D.C.: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
1996); Survey on Child Health (Washington, D.C.: National Center
for Health Statistics, 1993).
- D. Wayne Osgood and Jeff M. Chambers, “Social Disorganization
Outside the Metropolis: An Analysis of Rural Youth Violence,”
Criminology 38 (2000): 81–115; Nicholas Davidson, “Life
Without Father,” Policy Review 51 (1990): 40–44.
- Dewey Cornell et al., “Characteristics of Adolescents
Charged with Homicide,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law
5 (1987): 11–23.
- Anne-Marie Ambert, “The Effect of Male Delinquency on
Mothers and Fathers: A Heuristic Study,” Sociological Inquiry
69 (1999): 621–640; M. Eileen Matlock et al., “Family
Correlates of Social Skills Deficits in Incarcerated and Nonincarcerated
Adolescents,” Adolescence 29 (1994): 119–130.
- Judith L. Rubenstein et al., “Suicidal Behavior in Adolescents:
Stress and Protection in Different Family Contexts,” American
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 68 (1998): 274–284; Patricia
L. McCall and Kenneth C. Land, “Trends in White Male Adolescent
Young Adults and Elderly Suicide: Are There Common Underlying
Structural Factors?” Social Science Research 23 (1994):
57–81; Survey of Child Health (Washington, D.C.: National
Center for Health Statistics, 1993).
- Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (Washington,
D.C.: National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect, 1996), xviii;
Catherine M. Malkin and Michael E. Lamb, “Child Maltreatment:
A Test of Sociobiological Theory,” Journal of Comparative
Family Studies 25 (1994): 121–130.
- Urie Bronfenbrenner, “What Do Families Do?” Family
Affairs4 (1991): 1–6.
- Wade F. Horn et al., Fatherhood and Television: An Evaluation
of Fatherhood Portrayals on Prime-Time Television (Gaithersburg,
Md.: National Fatherhood Initiative, 2000).
- James Leiby, A History of Social Welfare and Social Work in
the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978),
39–40.
- Ibid., 40.
- Marvin Olasky, The Tragedy of American Compassion (Washington,
D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 152.
- Ibid., 184–190.
- James Leiby, A History of Social Welfare and Social Work in
the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978),
266–267.
- Marvin Olasky, The Tragedy of American Compassion (Washington,
D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 182–183; see also 1996 Green
Book (Washington, D.C.: Ways and Means Committee, 1996), 1225–1249.
- M. Anne Hill and June O’Neill, Underclass Behaviors in
the United States: Measurement and Analysis of Determinants (New
York: City University of New York/Baruch College, 1993).
- Mark A. Fossett and K. Jill Kiecolt, “Mate Availability
and Family Structure among African Americans in U.S. Metropolitan
Areas,” Journal of Marriage and Family 55 (1993): 288–302.
- C. R. Winegarden, “AFDC and Illegitimacy Ratios: A Vector-Autoregressive
Model,” Applied Economics 20 (1988): 1589–1601.
- Jodi R. Sandfort and Martha S. Hill, “Assisting Young,
Unmarried Mothers to Become Self-Sufficient: The Effects of Different
Types of Early Economic Support,” Journal of Marriage and
the Family 58 (1996): 311–326.
- 2000 Green Book (Washington, D.C.: Ways and Means Committee,
2000), table 7–27, 436–442.
- Ibid., 524.
- Timothy Grall, Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers:
1997 (Washington, D.C.: Census Bureau, 2000).
- 1996 Green Book (Washington, D.C.: Ways and Means Committee,
1996), 578.
- See, for example, Kristen A. Moore, Donna Ruane Morrison, Martha
Zaslow, and Dana A. Glei, “Ebbing and Flowing, Learning
and Growing: Family Economic Resources and Children’s Development”
(paper presented at the Workshop on Welfare and Child Development
sponsored by the Board of Children and Families of the National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development’s Family
and Child Well-Being Network, 1994).
- Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., and Christine Winquist Nord, “Parenting
Apart: Patterns of Child Rearing After Marital Disruption,”
Journal of Marriage and the Family47(1985): 896; J. A.
Seltzer, “Relationships between Fathers and Children Who
Live Apart: The Father’s Role after Separation,”Journal
of Marriage and the Family 53 (1991): 79–101.
- Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., and Andrew Cherlin, Divided Families:
What Happens to Children When Parents Part (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1991).
- Robert Lerman and Theodora Ooms, Young Unwed Fathers: Changing
Roles and Emerging Policies(Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple, 1993),
45.
- Ibid.
- Kristin A. Moore, “Nonmarital Childbearing in the United
States,”in Report to Congress on Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing
(Washington D.C.: Department of Health and Human Services, 1995),
vii.
- Linda S. Stephens, “Will Johnny See Daddy This Week?
An Empirical Test of Three Theoretical Perspectives of Postdivorce
Contact,” Journal of Family Issues 17 (1996): 466–494.
- Robert I. Lerman, “Unwed Fathers: Who They Are,”
American Enterprise, September/October 1993, 32–35.
- Gene Steuerle, “Removing Marriage Penalties: Is This
a Preventative Strategy?” (presentation at the American
Enterprise Institute’s conference on “America’s
Disconnected Youth: Toward a Preventative Strategy,” Washington,
D.C., May 16, 1996).
- David T. Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane, “The Impact of AFDC
on Family Structure and Living Arrangements,” Research in
Labor Economics7 (1985): 137–207. As noted by Ellwood and
Bane, for older groups, the impact of AFDC on the likelihood of
female headship was smaller. Overall, the authors estimated that
a one-hundred-dollar increase in benefit levels nationally would
increase the number of households headed by a single female by
as much as 15 percent.
- Stacy Dickert-Conlin, “Taxes, Transfers, and Family Structure”
(paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute’s
conference, “America’s Disconnected Youth: Toward
a Preventative Strategy,” Washington, D.C., May 16, 1996).
- Hillary Rodham Clinton, It Takes A Village—And Other
Lessons Children Teach Us (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996),
50.
- Alan Guttmacher Institute, Issues in Brief: Teenage Pregnancy
and the Welfare Reform Debate (New York: AGI, 1995), 3; 2000 Green
Book (Washington, D.C.: Ways and Means Committee, 2000), 1445.
- As cited in Douglas J. Besharov and Timothy S. Sullivan, “Welfare
Reform and Marriage,” The Public Interest 125 (1996): 83.
- LaDonna Pavetti, “The Dynamics of Welfare and Work: Exploring
the Process by Which Women Work Their Way Off Welfare” (Ph.D
dissertation, Kennedy School at Harvard University, 1993).
- Shelly Lundberg and Robert D. Plotnick, “Effects of State
Welfare, Abortion, and Family Planning Policies on Premarital
Childbearing among White Adolescents,” Family Planning Perspectives22
(1990): 246–251.
- Jason Fields, The Living Arrangements of Children: 1996 (Washington,
D.C.: Census Bureau, 2001); Wendy D. Manning and Daniel Lichter,
“Parental Cohabitation and Children’s Economic Well-Being,”
Journal of Marriage and the Family 58 (1996): 998–1010.
- Wendy D. Manning and Daniel Lichter, “Parental Cohabitation
and Children’s Economic Well-Being,” Journal
of Marriage and the Family 58 (1996): 998–1010.
- See, for example, J. D. McLeod and M. J. Shanahan, “Poverty,
Parenting, and Children’s Mental Health,” American
Sociological Review58 (1993): 351–366; and C. N. Velez,
J. Johnson, and P. Cohen, “A Longitudinal Analysis of Selected
Risk Factors for Childhood Psychopathology,” Journal of
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 28 (1989):
861–864.
- G. J. Duncan and W. L. Rodgers, “Longitudinal Aspects
of Child Poverty,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 50
(1988): 1007–1021.
- M. S. Hill and G. J. Duncan, “Parental Family Income
and the Socioeconomic Attainment of Children,” Social Science
Research 16 (1987): 39–73.
- Victor R. Fuchs and Diane M. Reklis, “America’s
Children: Economic Perspectives and Policy Options,” Science
225 (1992): 43.
- Historical Income Tables: Presence of Children under 18 Years
Old by Type of Family—Families (All Races) by Median and
Mean Income: 1974 to 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Census Bureau, 2000),
table F-10.
- 2000 Green Book (Washington, D.C.: Ways and Means Committee,
2000), 524.
- Mary Corcoran, Roger Gordon, Deborah Loren, and Gary Solon,
“The Association between Men’s Economic Status and
Their Family and Community Origins,” Journal of Human Resources
27(1992): 575–601.
- John Pepper, “Dynamics of the Intergenerational Transmission
of Welfare Receipt in the United States,” Journal of Family
and Economic Issues 16 (1995): 265–278.
- Margaret E. Ensminger, “Welfare and Psychological Distress:
A Longitudinal Study of African-American Urban Mothers,”
Journal of Health and Social Behavior36 (1995): 346–359.
- M. Anne Hill and June O’Neill, “Family Endowments
and the Achievement of Young Children with Special Reference to
the Underclass,” Journal of Human Resources 29(1994): 1094.
- Nicholas Zill and Christine Winquist Nord, Running in Place:
How American Families Are Faring in a Changing Economy and an
Individualistic Society (Washington, D.C.: Child Trends, 1994),
47.
- Mark A. Fossett and K. Jill Kiecolt, “Mate Availability
and Family Structure among African Americans in U.S. Metropolitan
Areas,” Journal of Marriage and the Family 55 (1993), 288–302;
Lawrence H. Ganong, Marilyn Coleman, Aaron Thompson, and Chanel
Goodwin-Watkins, “African-American and European-American
College Students’ Expectations for Self and for Future Partners,”
Journal of Family Issues 17 (1996): 758–775; Kim M. Lloyd
and Scott J. South, “Contextual Influences on Young Men’s
Transition to First Marriage,” Social Forces 74 (1996):
1097–1119; and Devendra Singh, “Female Judgment of
Male Attractiveness and Desirability for Relationships: Role of
Waist-to-Hip Ratio and Financial Status,” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 69 (1995): 1089–1101.
- William J. Darity, Jr., and Samuel L. Myers, “Family
Structure and the Marginalization of Black Men: Policy Implications,”
in The Decline in Marriage among African Americans, ed. M. Belinda
Tucker and Claudia Mitchell-Kernan (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1995), 263–321; see also Randall Stokes and Albert Chevan,
“Female-Headed Families: Social and Economic Context of
Racial Differences,” Journal of Urban Affairs18 (1996):
245–268.
- Patrick F. Fagan and Robert Rector, The Effects of Divorce
on America(Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2000), 13.
- 1996 Green Book (Washington, D.C.: Ways and Means Committee,
1996), 473. Note that the 1969 percentages were computed on the
basis of the total number of families.
- Ted G. Goertzel and Gary S. Young, “New Jersey’s
Experiment in Welfare Reform,” The Public Interest
125 (1996): 72–80.
- David Landry and Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, “How Old
Are U.S. Fathers?” Family Planning Perspectives 27
(1995): 159–165; Mike Males and Kenneth S. Y. Chew, “The
Ages of Fathers in California Adolescent Births: 1993,”
American Journal of Public Health86 (1996): 565–568.
- Mary Jo Coiro, Nicholas Zill, and Barbara Bloom, Health of
Our Nation’s Children (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Public Health
Service, 1994); see also Peter L. Benson, Anu R. Shorma, and Eugene
C. Roehlkepartain, Growing Up Adopted: A Portrait of Adolescents
and Their Families (Minneapolis, Minn.: Search Institute, 1993).
- Kristen A. Moore, “Nonmarital Childbearing in the United
States,” in Report to Congress on Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing
(Washington D.C.: Department of Health and Human Services, 1995),
figure 6.
- Based upon personal communications between the authors and
Fond du Lac County caseworkers and program administrators.
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