The 1993 Lord Acton Essay Competition

John Courtney Murray and the American Catholic Experience

Michael Tortolani

On December 7, 1965 the Second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church promulgated a landmark statement concerning religion, liberty and the relationship of church and state in the modern world (Dignitatis Humanae). To many American observers, the declaration was a tacit confirmation of the long-held traditions on this matter in their own country. However, for a considerable period, conservative Roman Catholic theologians had strongly opposed the liberal (or "progressive") views held by more ecumenically-minded Catholics--views most articulately expressed by Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray.¹ The seminal work of Murray served to reinterpret the Catholic Church's notion of religious obligation while also providing a universally recognizable defense of the freedoms requisite to the human search for self-understanding.

Murray's outlook on religion and freedom was developed largely from the focal point of political theory, but was greatly influenced as well by an increasingly ecumenical spirit present in a post-war period threatened by growing secularism.² As a result, what had begun as a primarily ecclesiastical matter in the Roman Church eventually evolved into a natural law-based justification of the need for religious freedom in general. Murray wrote eloquently from the liberal position which endorsed the separation of church and state as a means of protecting both institutions. The defense of religious liberty represented for Murray not only an advance in Catholic thought but, just as importantly, a post-modern defense of the free exercise of religion as a means of protecting the human conscience and the stability of the human community itself. He staunchly resisted the conventional claims of the "omni-competent" state and the temporal goals of Roman Catholicism. Despite these noble motives, Murray was consistently attacked by the conservative (or "traditional") element in the Catholic Church.

Murray developed his views in the journalistic forum of both America and Theological Studies (two publications for which he served in editorial capacities). Meanwhile, opposition was voiced by Msgr. Joseph Fenton of The American Ecclesiastical Review, a journal which Fenton edited during this period.³ The fact that Murray was at the core of a new way of thinking is chronicled in the records of these journals, as is the obvious development of his theories on the church-state issue--theories which were once silenced by his Jesuit superiors as smacking of a vague "heresy" known as "Americanism," but which were ultimately vindicated by the Second Vatican Council.

In 1942, Murray, in his role as Editor-in-Chief of Theological Studies, wrote an introductory preface to a series of contributed articles on inter-denominational cooperation.⁴ He opposed the strict readings of canon law made by Francis Connell concerning Christian cooperation. Instead, Murray found agreement with Jacques Maritain's statement that "no salvation outside the Church" could be interpreted, at least in part, as "no salvation outside the Truth."⁵ Murray saw himself well within the Catholic tradition in calling for progress, even to the point of quoting Pope Pius XII's Jubilee message: "No, there cannot be for the Church any going back."⁶ Murray continued to work with the theme of cooperation during the next year. However, he continually displayed an ability to remain within the tradition, while at the same time re-interpreting it with political theory. He analyzed Pius XI's 1928 encyclical Mortalium Animos (as he would later reinterpret the works of Leo XIII) as supporting religious cooperation.⁷

By 1945, John Courtney Murray moved toward an increasingly political orientation in his thinking. In the post-war period he began to view religious liberty as "a political problem of the first magnitude."⁸ He reacted against the state's ability to put "the human conscience in bondage," and identified certain governmental church-state policies as contributing to "political tumult and social decay."⁹ Later in the same year Murray acknowledged the Catholic Church's historically "devastating opposition" to doctrines on the conscience of humans and attempted to synthesize a new framework for discussing conscience and liberty. In defending the integrity of conscience Murray called it "the proximate subjective norm of human action," but balanced this statement by maintaining that "the conscience is not the norm of its own righteousness; it itself is regulated by a higher norm--the eternal law of God."¹⁰

From 1946 to 1948 Murray began to focus specifically on the American religious-political scene. In a series of articles published in America, he examined contemporary discussions of the first clause of the First Amendment concerning the so-called separation of church and state. He stressed that the document had imperceptibly and misleadingly become viewed as a theological document. He rebutted such views by asserting that the amendment was an ethical and political document in which its "content is the doctrine that religious conscience is immune from government coercion."¹¹ Along with his publication of commentaries on Supreme Court decisions on the First Amendment,¹² Murray wrote a defense of Catholic teaching on religious liberty which urged Catholics to help dispel the anti-democratic myths perpetrated against the church.¹³

Up to this point, little in Murray's writings was considered as objectionable by the conservative camp. However, by 1949 Murray was openly challenging the long-held conservative position. In a 1949 article, Murray challenged the traditional Catholic position that "the state should favor the truth" as being synonymous with granting "those who possess the truth the exclusive right of free speech."¹⁴ The arguments and content of the previous century's debate expressed in papal encyclicals had changed. Murray held with Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn that "the whole question of tolerance toward men of other faiths has nothing to do with relativism and indifferentism in matters of faith."¹⁵ He concluded his article by questioning whether the dogmatic concept ("the freedom of the Church") necessarily coincided with the constitutional concept ("the religion of the state").¹⁶

The reaction to Murray came also from George Shea, who challenged Murray's premise of the non-necessity of a state religion, as well as Murray's temporal and historically conditioned approach to Leo XIII's Humanum Genus (1884) and Immortale Dei (1885).¹⁷ Shea went on to invoke Canon 1381, section 3 (1917 Code) as asserting that the church had the right to call upon the state to repress heresy--a thesis denied by Murray as inhibiting true liberty.¹⁸

Fenton soon joined ranks by approaching the topic from a most peculiar angle--that of the church's liturgical rites (the Pontifacle Romanum) and the duty of kings in a Catholic state.¹⁹ Fenton attempted to indirectly apply these principles against Murray's defense of democratic non-coercion and concluded that, "The truth that the state, like every other human society, is objectively obligated to worship God according to the one religion He has established and commanded is so obviously a part of Catholic doctrine that no theologian has any excuse to call it into question."²⁰

Murray responded to the initial attacks by Shea and Fenton in both his own journal,²¹ and in Fenton's The American Ecclesiastical Review, in which Fenton added the understated editorial caveat: "[The Editor] does not share Fr. Murray's views on the subject of this article."²² In a thorough and well-developed historical approach, Murray traced the development of church-state relations and concluded that the concept of a "religious state" was a "trans-temporal exigency" required to preserve the Catholic faith, but was not a permanent and unalterable one. "It is not the direct function of the Church to create a social order," he wrote, "any more than it is the direct function of the state to save souls."²³ Murray thus challenged the conservative assumption that the desired establishment of a Catholic state religion is necessarily a religious act, that is, a matter of faith. Rather, it is a legal act of juridical institution, and therefor, not requisite of the church.²⁴

Examples of the polemics can be multiplied from the following year (1952), however, that is not the purpose here. It will suffice to note that Fenton continued to carry the conservative banner, frequently employing papal encyclicals, the statements of the conservative Cardinal Ottaviani, and canon law-based arguments. Fr. Francis Connell joined in the debate on Fenton's side that same year, by asserting against Murray's thesis: "I cannot see why homage cannot be rendered to Christ the King, and obedience given to His laws, and special favor shown to His Church in a democracy, just because it is a democracy."²⁵

Murray countered the arguments in great detail. Consistently, he maintained that the American system of separation (where the distinction between church and state is protected, not denied) differed greatly from the European liberalism fought against in the previous century (where separation meant subordination of the church to the demands of the state).²⁶

The debate between the two factions had attracted considerable international attention, and in 1954, Murray's Jesuit superiors requested that he stop speaking and writing on the topics of religious freedom and church-state relations. Murray obeyed the request for the most part, and produced only minor non-scholarly articles which touched on the subjects of freedom and responsibility.²⁷

At the opening of the Vatican Council, John Courtney Murray was initially persona non grata. However, by the time the assembly met for the second time (September 29 to December 4, 1963) Murray was enlisted as a peritus for his expertise in ecumenical thought. The role of Murray in drafting the document on religion and liberty was readily acknowledged, both by council observers,²⁸ and by Bishop De Smedt--the Belgian theologian who initially introduced the document to the assembled council.²⁹

The declaration, which eventually found a life of its own apart from a related declaration on ecumenism, went through more revisions than any other text at the council--a total of six different completed drafts.³⁰ The final schema was strongly promoted by the American Bishops, and Cardinal Ritter of St. Louis called the issue of religious freedom the "basis and prerequisite for ecumenical contacts with other Christian bodies."³¹ Cardinal Ottaviani agreed with the principle that no one could be forced in matters of religion, but felt the text exaggerated by saying "he is worthy of honor who obeys his own conscience," and also opposed the idea that every type of religion had the right to propagate itself.³²

Perhaps it was De Smedt's introductory statement of the first schema which caused Ottaviani and the conservatives such concern. The Belgian Bishop's definition of liberty focused heavily on the dictates of conscience, and not so much on the natural law justification theme that had propelled the American liberal thought for decades.³³ Murray made a point of addressing these concerns in future revisions of the declaration. De Smedt, like Murray before him, engaged in a re-interpretation of earlier papal encyclicals. Referring to Pius IX's Quanta Cura, the Bishop maintained that: 1) Pius rightly opposed rationalist thought that the individual conscience is under no divine law, 2) that freedom of worship is rightly condemned when based on religious indifferentism, and 3) that a separation of church and state based on the juridical omni-competence of the state is fraudulent.³⁴

Murray felt that the weakness of the first two schemas (the November 19, 1963 version and the subsequent version discussed September 23-25, 1964) was their insistence on moving along a line of theological and ethical arguments which ignored the historical perspective and developments of the church and the world in their attempts to present "eternal truths."³⁵ Murray considered these two drafts to be "simplistic and inadequate," since the "rights of conscience" argument by liberals found no clear tradition in the church, and therefor could not be made the sole basis for a conciliar document.³⁶

Murray helped in guiding the third schema away from the "conscience" argument as its basis (although this remains a central theme in the declaration) and toward a more juridical foundation which would establish the rights, and even the requirement, of religious liberty. Using the American Constitution's First Amendment as background material, Murray defined true freedom not only in its negative content ("freedom from coercion"), but also as a concept which does not sanction religious indifference either--"it is simply a recognition of the limited functions of the juridical order of society as the legal armature of human rights."³⁷ The move into the third draft, then, was a move from the rights of conscience to the "dignity of the human person" as a basis for the document--a theme which found itself in the thick of church tradition as well as in the spirit of the council.³⁸

On December 7, 1965, the sixth and final draft of the declaration was voted upon by the council. Two thousand, three hundred and eight Bishops voted in favor of the revised text, while 70 voted against it. The small but vocal opposition was concerned largely with not promoting religious indifferentism, as well as with the fear that the power of the state would be enhanced at the expense of the church.³⁹

The importance of the document, however, was quickly appreciated by non-Catholics who saw the declaration as a sure sign of Catholic intentions toward human liberty. Robert McAfee Brown declared that "no more important immediate test of ecumenical sincerity was debated at the Council than this Declaration."⁴⁰ From the Catholic perspective, Msgr. John Tracy Ellis stated that no document at Vatican II was of more significance to him, and that the church had "finally been won to the principle of semper reformanda."⁴¹

After the council, Murray felt that a major tide had turned, and this he attributed to two key documents:

The statements in Gaudium et Spes like those in Dignitatis Humanae, represent aggiornamento. And they are programmatic for the future. From now on, the Church defines her mission in the temporal order in terms of the realization of human dignity, the promotion of the rights of man, the growth of the human family towards unity, and the sanctification of the secular activities of this world.⁴²

This, he felt, would allow the Catholic Church the ability to function more fully in the spiritual order (its actual mission), while interacting in a more proper relationship with the temporal order.

In affirming the American experience, Murray outlined three ways in which the political system in his own country had influenced his thought on religion and liberty.⁴³ First, America had proven by experience that political unity and stability were possible without uniformity of religious beliefs and practices, and without the necessity of governmental restrictions on any religion. Second, stable political unity was enhanced by the exclusion of religious differences from the area of concern allotted to the government. Third, and most importantly, both the state and religion (not least of all the Catholic Church) had benefited by free institutions and by the maintenance of the separation of church and state.

From the vantage point of history it can be seen that John Courtney Murray was able to utilize what was best in Roman Catholic theology and social theory, American constitutional democracy, and natural law arguments to provide an ardent defense of the need (and basis) for the free exercise of religion. While he is not on record as having referenced Lord Acton's passage concerning the relationship between liberty and the free exercise of religion, he undoubtedly represents what was foremost in Acton's thoughts on the matter. For Murray, as for Acton, neither coercion toward, nor away from religion could be the basis for a truly free human society. Beyond fear and obligation--surmounting even the individual's right to freedom of conscience--rests Murray's socio-religious theory of the inherent dignity of the human individual participating in the experience of the human community.

Michael J. Tortolani (honorable mention), is a doctoral candidate in historical theology at St. Louis University. He is a graduate of Boston College and Providence College as well as a member of Alpha Sigma Nu, the National Jesuit Honor Society. Upon graduation, Mr. Tortolani plans to teach at Providence College.

Notes

1. As early as 1942 Murray was hailed by America Editor-in-Chief John LaFarge, S.J. as an inspiring force in the budding ecumenical movement opposed by conservative thinkers such as Francis Connell. See John LaFarge, "Some Questions as to Interdenominational Cooperation," Theological Studies 3 (1942): 313-32.
2. Robert W. McElroy, The Search for an American Public Theology: The Contribution of John Courtney Murray (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 10-15.
3. Other voices in the conservative camp concerning church-state relations included Fathers John A. Ryan, Francis J. Connell (Dean of the theological faculty at Catholic University), and George Shea (Immaculate Conception Seminary in New Jersey).
4. John Courtney Murray, "Current Theology: Christian Cooperation," Theological Studies 3 (1942): 413-31.
5. Ibid, 422.
6. Ibid, 431.
7. In "Cooperation: Some Further Views," Theological Studies 4 (1943): 102, Murray wrote: "Whether, and how, a practical co-operation of the adherents of different confessions is possible or advisable, does not belong to the theme of the encyclical."
8. John Courtney Murray, "Current Theology: Freedom of Religion," Theological Studies 6 (1945): 85-113.
9. Ibid.
10. John Courtney Murray, "Freedom of Religion: The Ethical Problem," Theological Studies 6 (1945): 229-86.
11. John Courtney Murray, "Separation of Church and State," America (December 7, 1946): 261-63.
12. John Courtney Murray, "The Court Upholds Religious Freedom,"America (March 8, 1947: 628-29; "Dr. Morrison and the First Amendment," America (March 6, 1948): 627-30; "Dr. Morrison and the First Amendment: II," America (March 20, 1948): 683-86.
13. Murray wrote "It is time that Catholics, too, woke up. We need to go down into the City and prove by more deeds than we have hitherto shown that we are the friends of its liberties, that our progress is its progress, that our power is in its service, that no man has to fear from us infringement of any of his rights," in "Religious Liberty: The Concern of All," America (February 7, 1948): 515.
14. John Courtney Murray, "Current Theology: On Religious Freedom," Theological Studies 10 (1949): 411.
15. Ibid, 413.
16. Ibid, 422.
17. George W. Shea, "Catholic Doctrine and 'The Religion of the State,'" The American Ecclesiastical Review 123 (1950): 161-74.
18. Ibid, 174.
19. Joseph Clifford Fenton,"The Relation of the Christian State to the Catholic Church according to the Pontificale Romanum," The American Ecclesiastical Review 123 (1950): 214-18.
20. Ibid, 218.
21. John Courtney Murray, "The Problem of State Religion," Theological Studies 12 (1951): 155-78.
22. John Courtney Murray, "The Problem of 'The Religion of the State,'" The American Ecclesiastical Review 124 (1951): 327-52.
23. Ibid, 331.
24. Murray, "The Problem of State Religion," 171.
25. Francis J. Connell, "Reply to Father Murray," The American Ecclesiastical Review 126 (1952): 49-59.
26. Francis Canavan, "Religious Freedom: John Courtney Murray and Vatican II," Faith & Reason 8 (1987): 329-31.
27. Murray's articles in this period included "Church, State and Political Freedom," Catholic Mind 56 (September, 1957): 436-47; and "Freedom, Responsibility and the Law," Catholic Mind 57 (May, 1959): 216-29.
28. See James C. O'Neill, "Ecumenism Schema Seen as Meeting Challenges," in Council Daybook: Vatican II, ed. Floyd Anderson (Washington D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1965), 299-300.
29. "Credit Lines" section in America 109 (December 14, 1963): 766.
30. Ralph M. Wiltgen, The Rhine Flows into the Tiber: The Unknown Council (New York: Hawthorne, 1967), 159.
31. Ibid, 161.
32. Ibid, 164.
33. Bishop Emile De Smedt, introductory text in Council Speeches of Vatican II, ed. Hans Kung, et al. (Glen Rock: Paulist Press, 1964), 239.
34. Ibid, 246-47.
35. John Courtney Murray, "The Declaration on Religious Freedom: A Moment in Its Legislative History," in Religious Liberty: An End and a Beginning, ed. John Courtney Murray (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 21.
36. Canavan, "Religious Freedom," 332.
37. Murray, Religious Liberty: An End and a Beginning, 37.
38. Canavan, "Religious Freedom," 333.
39. Linnan, John, "Declaration on Religious Liberty." Chapter in Vatican II and Its Documents: An American Reappraisal, ed. Timothy E. O'Connell, (Collegeville: Michael Glazier, 1991),169.
40. Robert McAfee Brown in Vatican II: An Interfaith Appraisal, ed. John Miller (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 564.
41. John Tracy Ellis, "Religious Freedom: An American Reaction," in Vatican II Revisited by Those Who Were There, ed. Alberic Stacpoole (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1986), 294-96.
42. John Courtney Murray, "The Issue of Church and State at Vatican Council II," Theological Studies 27 (1966): 601.
43. John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 72-73.