The 1993 Lord Acton Essay Competition

True and False Freedom

Colette F. Flood

Lord Acton says, "Liberty is the highest political end of man ...[but] no country can be free without religion." In thus saying, he establishes an inseparable union between liberty and religion many no longer recognize. Indeed, a misunderstood notion of "separation of Church and State" in our country has taken hold not only on the political level, but, also in the minds of individual men. Perhaps the notion of license which has evolved from the American notion of freedom, and its manifestations in American culture, is one example that might be used to support Lord Acton's claim that liberty devoid of religion is no liberty at all.

The quote by Lord Acton which inspires this essay hints at various themes related to freedom which inspire present debate. Among these themes are the questions of toleration, religious freedom, the practical manifestations of "separation of Church and State," and the relationship between freedom and law. Also, the most fundamental question of all, which is the basis of these others, is that of the definition of true freedom (liberation). Can there be multiple definitions of freedom, and if so, of which is it that Lord Acton speaks?

Although modernity, and the liberal state in particular, is apparently at odds with Lord Acton's conception of freedom, he is not alone in advocating liberation via religion. Many thinkers support his idea that the modern conception of freedom is a perversion of its true definition.

Lord Acton would defend the compatibility of the American project of ordered liberty with Christianity. The compatibility of religion and liberty, however, is dependent on a proper understanding of liberty. The popular conception of liberty today is freedom from constraint. Constraint may take many forms: laws, rules, authority figures, to name a few. One who subscribes to such an understanding of liberty seeks perfect autonomy which often degenerates into license. "Rights language" is popular in today's literature because it is reflective of man's pursuit of autonomy. The political concept of freedom is deficient in that it does not mandate the duties which correspond to all rights; it allows for license. Rights and duties are inseparable. Lord Acton says, "the greater the strength of duty, the greater the liberty." His concept of freedom is duty for the truth rather than from it.

One way of understanding the disparity between rival conceptions of freedom is to understand the different definitions of the word "free." Advertisers know that using the word "free" in various types of advertisements is a sure way of attracting the attention of the literate public. There are, however, two ways in which "free" may be understood: either as something for nothing, or as a bonus for having undertaken an obligation or for having purchased something. An example of the former definition might be a generous old codger handing out winter coats on a street corner in a poor neighborhood in the dead of winter. His sign reading "Free Coats" guarantees that without incurring any expense, a bum may approach the codger and receive a coat. Such a notion of "free" corresponds to the notion of freedom as license in that in both cases, man expects something for nothing. In one case, man expects a coat at no charge, in the other case man expects to enjoy rights (often of his own determination, or [even] fabrication) without incurring any responsibility or corresponding duty.

The second way in which we understand "free" takes place, for example, when it is "free Cubs hat day" at Wrigley Field. On free hat day, all those in attendance at the park receive a souvenir Cubs hat upon entering. The reception of a hat, however, presupposes the purchase of a ticket to the game. Hats are not given to the kids outside on Waveland Avenue waiting to catch home run balls, nor are they given to those in attendance across town at Comiskey Park. Receiving a hat in this case is dependent on a prior action, which may also be called a duty. Those who were unwilling to purchase a ticket understand that they forego the reception of a hat and so it is with the notion of freedom for the truth. Those who are free for the truth are those who willingly accept the duties which correspond to their rights, which are never self-determined, but always given by some authority.

The average person would be more attracted to the first type of "free"; that is, they would prefer something for nothing. He [or she], therefore, must be persuaded why what appears to be a more restrictive notion of free, is in the end, more liberating.

Luckily, there are many articulate and convincing defenders of the latter understanding of freedom. Although freedom as pure license is a fairly recent development (at least on a large cultural scale), the defense of true liberty has gone on for some time. Pope Leo XIII, in 1888, wrote his encyclical On the Nature of Human Liberty. In this document, Pope Leo identifies man's reason as a pre-requisite for liberty, and law as the proper ordination of reason. He rejects as absurd the notion that because man is free he is exempt from the law; on the contrary, he says "the truth is that we are bound to submit to law precisely because we are free by our very nature." Pope Leo also makes it abundantly clear that all human law takes its authority from the divine and eternal law of God. He says, "just as civil society did not create human nature, so neither can it be said to be the author of the good which befits human nature, or of the evil which is contrary to it."

Pope Leo clearly understands the depth and the greatness of Lord Acton's type of duty, which Pope Leo calls "obedience." When speaking of submission to law rooted in God's authority, Pope Leo says, "obedience is greatly ennobled when subjected to an authority which is the most just and supreme of all." He continues, "the eternal law of God is the sole standard and rule of human liberty, not only in each individual man, but also in the community and civil society which men constitute when united." Pope Leo does, however, have a more narrow conception of freedom than does Lord Acton.

The recognition of divine authority is prevalent in all papal documents, although articulated in different ways. In his encyclical Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul II has a distinctly different view from that of Pope Leo. Discussing Centesimus Annus in the December 1992 issue of First Things, Russell Hittinger writes, "He (John Paul II) sees clearly that the older notion of the state as the image of divine authority does not square with modern political realities." The beauty of the Pope's vision is like that of Lord Acton in that both recognize not only a transcendent view of man, but also of truth. Both men see that truth, and the freedom to pursue truth, transcend all political realities. John Paul II never endorses a particular political regime and yet he says everything that is necessary without doing so. Hittinger writes, "even though the Pope (John Paul II) regards religion as the center of culture, and hence the preeminent locus for solidarity, he nevertheless insists that juridical right to religious liberty is the 'primary foundation of every authentically free political order.'" Likewise, Lord Acton recognizes the attractiveness of the liberal state, but he says:

the same deliberate rejection of the moral code which smoothed the paths of the absolute monarchy and of oligarchy, signalized the advent of the democratic claim to unlimited power,--that one of its leading champions avowed the design of corrupting the moral sense of men, in order to destroy the influence of religion, and a famous apostle of the Enlightenment and toleration wished that the last king might be strangled with the entrails of the last priest.

He recognizes that a misunderstanding of liberty, in any type of political structure, spells disaster.

John Paul II recognizes the subtle, but lethal corruption of liberty among individuals as posing a greater danger to liberty than direct attacks on the state. He says:

The root of modern totalitarianism is to be found in the denial of the transcendent dignity of the human person who, as the visible image of the invisible God, is therefore by his very nature the subject of rights which no one may violate--no individual, group, class, nation, or state.

Hittinger summarizes the Pope's position by writing, "From John Paul's perspective, the modern state has not so much as defaced the political image of divine governance vested in the civil authority as it has assaulted that image as it subsists in human persons." This corruption of divine governance in individuals is equal to the corruption of liberation (and duty) as understood from its proper, religious perspective. This assault can take place in any regime, with virtually equal success. Hittinger hints at John Paul II's solution: "it is generally clear what the Pope has in mind: natural rights that are in one or another sense antecedent to political society."

Rights language can be precarious in that some use it without retaining its corresponding notion of duty, which both John Paul II and Lord Acton see as fundamental to its very definition. Speaking of the "rights of man" at least allows John Paul II to travel in a political and cultural world where Pope Leo's language might fall on deaf ears. The term "rights" of man is far from empty though, and its proper use could contribute to the restoration of a correct understanding of liberty in the public sphere. Lord Acton says:

It was from America that the plain ideas that men ought to mind their own business, and that the nation is responsible to Heaven for the acts of the State,--ideas long locked in the breast of solitary thinkers, and hidden among the Latin folios,--burst forth like a conqueror upon the world they were destined to transform, under the title of the Rights of Man.

The state which focuses on the rights of man, minus the equally beautiful notion of duties, cannot enjoy the fruits of true liberty. Of the documents from Vatican Council II, only one is addressed to the whole world (Catholics and non-Catholics alike), and that is the Decree on Religious Freedom. The document says, "Government, therefore, ought indeed to take account of the religious life of the people and show it favor, since the function of government is to make provision for the common welfare." The authors of the document exhort educators to:

form men, too, who will be lovers of true freedom--men, in other words, who will come to decisions on their own judgement and in the light of truth, govern their activities with a sense of responsibility, and strive after what is true and right, willing always to join with others in cooperative effort.

Without this encouragement, and without examples of truly free leaders, man remains a slave to his own whims. Lord Acton says religion "strengthens the notion of duty. If men are not kept straight by duty, they must be by fear." History has born out the truth of these words. Freedom without religion breeds license rather than virtue, and men without virtue are not free men.

In his essay "The History of Freedom in Christianity" Lord Acton lists "a manly sense of duty" alongside of perseverance, moderation and individuality as traits which "give to the English race its supremacy in the stern art of labor...." These adjectives may also be called virtues. Elsewhere, Lord Acton treats the acquisition of the virtue of duty as a fruit of the virtue of religion. In turn, he treats duty as a forerunner of true liberty. We can assume from this progression that Lord Acton's sense of duty is different from the Kantian conception, which is hardly liberating, and closer to the Thomistic definition of duty, whose author likewise understood religion as the source of true liberation. Pope Leo expresses the agreement of Lord Acton and Saint Thomas Aquinas: "No true virtue can exist without religion...therefore religion, which (as St. Thomas says) 'performs those actions which are directly and immediately ordained for the divine honor,' rules and tempers all virtues."

G. K. Chesterton said that when you smash the universal law, you are left with a bunch of little laws. In separating the political realm from religion, the State smashes the universal law. Men subject to little laws come to reinterpret or even dispense with laws according to their own taste, and justify their exemptions under the guise of "freedom." Soren Kierkegaard speaks of the prophet Abraham as an example of faith. He says that had Abraham handed over his son Isaac out of fear, or an empty conception of duty, "he may well have loved God, but he would not have had faith; for he who loves God without faith reflects on himself, while the person who loves God reflects on God." Although Lord Acton himself speaks of love of God, Kierkegaard expresses the truth that liberty without God is not liberty , but enslavement to self.

Colette F. Flood (third place winner), graduated valedictorian from the University of Dallas in 1993 with a degree in philosophy. Following graduation, she has pursued nursing and, in time, hopes to do graduate work in bioethics.