John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, as you probably all know,
was born on January 10, 1834. You are less apt to know that he was born not
in England as becomes a proper English Lord, but in Naples. The fact that he
was born in the Palazoo Acton all'chiaja in Naples is not without significance,
nor is the fact that he died and was buried in Tergensee, just south of Munich
in Bavaria; for surely aside from Prince Albert, Acton must have been the most
un-English of any prominent Englishman in the nineteenth century.
Lord Acton's grandfather, Sir John Francis Acton, whose name
"Johnny" Acton bore, had been an eighteenth-century English soldier
of fortune on a grand scale and had become "General Acton" and prime
minister of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Ferdinand, King of Naples, was
a dullard and a buffoon who spent his time hunting and amused himself by playing
the hurdy-gurdy. His queen, Maria Carolina, daughter of Maria Theresa of Austria
and sister of the ill-fated Marie Antoinette, had an eye both for power and
powerful men. Sir John Acton struck her fancy and rumor had it that John Acton
became her paramour. It was unsubstantiated rumor, however, for John Acton's
steely nature knew enough not to mix the pursuit of power with the pursuit of
pleasure. Together John Acton and Maria Carolina ruled the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies, insuring its survival through the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
period. Our Lord Acton did not approve of his grandfather, and regarded the
Neapolitan inheritance as "blood money." It is only fair to say that
in all likelihood General John Acton would not have approved of his grandson,
for he was an eighteenth century authoritarian who had nothing but contempt
for liberty.
Those who would like to explore the Neapolitan world into which
our Lord Acton was born in 1834 can not do better than read the magnificent
novel by Giuseppe di Lampedusa, The Leopard, translated from the Italian by
Archibald Colquhoun (New York: Pantheon Press, 1960).
Lord Acton's paternal uncle was a saintly cardinal, promoted
to that position in 1842 when he was only thirty-nine by Gregory XVI. He died
in 1847 in the Jesuit house in Naples. His name, Charles Edward Januarius, reveals
the Neapolitan Acton connections. Harold Acton has given us a vibrant picture
of the activities of General John Acton in The Bourbons of Naples, 1734-1825
(London: Methnen & Co., 1956).
Yes, it's an unlikely beginning for the historian of liberty
and the passionate friend of the United States. His mother, moreover, brought
an ancestry which was perhaps even less inclined to a devotion to freedom. Acton's
mother was the daughter of the Duke of Dalberg. The Dalbergs were Electors of
the Holy Roman Emperors, and in the imperial coronation ceremony at Frankfurt,
a herald sounded a trumpet at the beginning of the coronation rite and called
out, "Is there a Dalberg present?" at which point a Dalberg stood
and identified himself and the ceremony was then able to proceed. Lord Acton's
paternal grandmother belonged to a great Rhineland family. When Lord Acton's
mother died in 1860 he inherited the Dalberg schloss at Herrnsheim in the Rhineland.
In 1865 Acton married his cousin, the Countess Marie Ann Arco-Valley, a marriage
which reinforced his German, in this case, Bavarian connections. Add to these
bonds of birth and marriage the fact that Acton studied for six years at the
University of Munich and it becomes clear that Acton's Englishness was extremely
attenuated. Acton was, in fact, a member of the Continental imperial aristocracy
compared to which the Whig aristocracy which dominated nineteenth-century England
(so brilliantly depicted in the Palliser novels of Antony Trollope) were the
merest upstarts.
Still, Acton had Whig connections. When Lord Acton was three
his father died and in 1840, when Acton was six, his mother married Lord Leveson,
later the 2nd Earl Granville, one of the great Whig magnates of the nineteenth
century. Lord Leveson's uncle was the Duke of Devonshire, one of the wealthiest
men in England in the nineteenth century. In short, Acton moved in circles characterized
by wealth, power and privilege; never mind that he did not ride and shoot and
that his relationship to his step-father was cool.
How, having been reared in such an atmosphere, are we to explain
Acton's passionate commitment to liberty and his intense interest in and high
estimate of the American experiment? In 1901, the year before his death, in
his last lecture at Cambridge University, Acton concludes, "And yet, by
the development of the principle of Federalism, [America] has produced a community
more powerful, more prosperous, more intelligent, and more free than any other
which the world has seen." Lectures on Modern History, edited with an introduction
by John Neville Figgis and Reginald Vere Laurence (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1952).
It is the contention of this lecture that if we understand
the development of Acton's attitude towards the United States we will find ourselves
in possession of the key to Acton's thought in general.
Acton placed liberty in the forefront of all goods, moral and
political. You are all aware that the great uncompleted project of his life
was the writing of a history of freedom. He saw the evolution of liberty as
the work of Providence, as the consequence as he put it of Christ's being "risen
on the world." Achieved liberty is the fulfillment of the divine plan.
It is for this reason above all others that Acton so valued the American experiment.
Liberty, however, is seen as the end of history, achieved only
in the fullness of time and only as a consequence of a long developmental process.
Liberty, personal and political, could not come into existence until the way
had been prepared for it by the development of conscience. Almost as important
to Acton's thinking as tracing the history of freedom was his effort to describe
the growth of the idea of conscience. In the 60,000 volumes of his personal
library he searched for the historical stages in the development of the idea
of conscience. It was not an easy task and I might add it is a task which has
been all but abandoned by philosophers and intellectual historians in our own
day. Acton saw clearly that liberty was predicated on the existence of conscience.
But what was conscience? What were the powerful arguments against the existence
of conscience? How did the idea of conscience develop historically? Should the
promptings of conscience always be obeyed? Could the conscience err? Was there
a universal voice of conscience or was the conscience of each man a unique and
independent authority? How did conscience manifest itself in politics? These
are some of the problems with which Acton wrestled. Is it any wonder that he
did not write his history of freedom?
The autonomy of conscience was, Acton tells us, recognized
by Socrates and the Greeks. As he notes in his Additional Manuscripts (Add.
Mss.), the word "conscience" occurs in the New Testament 32 times
(4901, p. 66). The Stoics believed that the voice of God dwells in our souls
and that we must obey this voice. But Saint Thomas Aquinas is the source of
the modern idea of conscience. Acton wrote in an extended note (Add. Mss. 4901),
"S. Thomas. As to penal laws, he went with his generation. For half a century
when he wrote, not a voice had been raised for toleration. He strengthened a
view which could hardly be stranger. But in respect of conscience he innovated.
He went farther than all his time in proclaiming its authority. This was peculiarly
his own idea-set out by him, and gifted with power, in time to overcome the
other." Acton further observed, (Add. Mss. 5395), "Conscience depends
on, or is parallel with clear notions of ethics. Obscure ethics indicate imperfect
conscience. Therefore obscure ethics imply imperfect liberty. For liberty comes
not with any ethical system, but with a very developed one"
Not until the seventeenth century was conscience grounded in
a universal natural law. In his essay (1877), "The History of Freedom in
Christianity" Acton wrote:
The French philosopher Charron was one of the men least demoralized
by party spirit, and least blinded by zeal for a cause. In a passage almost
literally taken from St. Thomas, he describes our subordination under a law
of nature, to which all legislation must conform; and he ascertains it not by
the light of revealed religion, but by the voice of universal reason, through
which God enlightens the consciences of men. Upon this foundation Grotius drew
the lines of real political science. In gathering the materials of international
law, he had to go beyond national treaties and denominational interests for
a principle embracing all mankind...
Having established the primacy of conscience and rooted it in
a universal natural law, Acton was ready to explore its political instantiation.
He found that intersection of conscience, liberty and politics in America.
As early as 1858 Acton had observed in an essay which appeared
in his journal, The Rambler,
The Christian notion of conscience imperatively demands a corresponding
measure of personal liberty. The feeling of duty and responsibility to God is
the only arbiter of a Christian's actions. With this no human authority can
be permitted to interfere. We are bound to extend to the utmost, and to guard
from every encroachment, the sphere in which we can act in obedience to the
sole voice of conscience, regardless of any other consideration.
Acton repeatedly noted that the Protestant Reformation and
the wars of religion led to the establishment of absolutism rather than toleration
and freedom. Royal power and bureaucratic administration, whether Catholic or
Protestant, was substituted for the imperatives of conscience. Established churches
used the power of the state to coerce the consciences of the subject. The Puritan
revolution in England appealed to the higher law of conscience but then sank
back into intolerance and repression. It was the sectarians, at first in England
and then in America who justified religious nonconformity by an appeal to conscience.
In Add. Mss. 4901, page 355, Acton wrote: "The theory
of conscience was full grown. It had assumed in one of the sects, a very peculiar
shape: the doctrine of inner light. The Quakers not originally liberals. But
the inner light struggled vigorously for freedom. In the very days in which
the theory of conscience reached its extreme terms, Penn proclaimed conscience
as the teaching of his sect. And it became the basis of Pennsylvania-Voltaire's
best government." He added in Add. Mss. 4960, p. 299, "Conscience
understood in this way supplied a new basis for freedom. It carried further
the range of Whiggism. The deeper Quakers perceived the consequences, Penn drew
the consequences in the Constitution of Pennsylvania. It was the standard of
a new party and a new world."
But not only the Protestant sects insisted on freedom of conscience
and obedience to a higher law; Roman Catholics in Maryland pointed the way to
the new world of freedom. In an essay, "The Protestant Theory of Persecution,"
published in The Rambler in March, 1862, Acton wrote:
At the same time when this involuntary change occurred [Anglican persecution
under the Stuarts], the sects that caused it were the bitterest enemies of the
toleration they demanded. In the same age the Puritans and the Catholics sought
a refuge beyond the Atlantic from the persecution which they suffered together
under the Stuarts. Flying for the same reason, and from the same oppression,
they were enabled respectively to carry out their own views in the colonies
which they founded in Massachusetts and Maryland, and the history of those two
states exhibit faithfully the contrast between the two churches. The Catholic
emigrants established, for the first time in modern history, a government in
which religion was free, and with it the germ of that religious liberty which
now prevails in America. The Puritans, on the other hand, revived with greater
severity the penal laws of the mother country. In the process of time the liberty
of conscience in the Catholic colony was forcibly abolished by the neighboring
Protestants of Virginia; while on the borders of Massachusetts the new State
of Rhode Island was formed by a party of fugitives from the intolerance of their
fellow-colonists.
In every case the appeal was to conscience, a conscience which
defied the laws of man in order to obey the law of God. It was but a step from
an appeal to liberty in religion to an appeal to liberty in politics. The appeal
to the higher law made by the framers of the Declaration of Independence was
only a more abstract and universal conception of liberty than the appeal to
conscience made in the name of religion. In Add. Mss. 4897, p. 130, Acton noted,
"America started with the habit of abstract ideas. Rhode Island, Pennsylvania.
It came to them from religion and the Puritan struggle. So they went beyond
conservation of national rights. The rights of man grew out of English toleration.
It was the link between tradition and abstraction."
In his Cambridge University lecture (1901) on "The American
Revolution," Acton put the revolutionary shift from rights based on the
fact that the colonists were Englishmen to rights based on a universal appeal
to a higher law in this way (Acton, Lectures on Modern History, p. 307):
Then James Otis spoke, and lifted the question to a different level,
in one of the memorable speeches of political history. Assuming, but not admitting,
that the Boston Custom-house officers were acting legally, and within the statute,
then he said the statute was wrong. Their action might be authorized by parliament;
but if so, parliament had exceeded its authority, like Charles with his ship
money, and James with the dispensing power. There are principles which override
precedents. The laws of England may be a very good thing but there is such a
thing as a higher law.
Acton argued with great force that England's colonial rule
in America had been one of the mildest and most beneficent colonial regimes
in history. Americans were not rebelling against oppression. The American course
was justified solely on the basis of our appeal to a higher law, justified solely
by an appeal to the rights of political conscience. These were arguments Acton
understood, approved and applauded.
The foundation of the American republic was, Acton rightly
understood, not completed with the successful termination of the American Revolution.
The American Revolution created a political society in which the unchecked will
of the people was paramount, state governments in which the tyranny of the majority
would, sooner or later lead to anarchy. The second great act of the founding,
the making of the Constitution, was a conservative act which made the creation
of a republic possible. The creation of the Constitution had two great objects
in view, the prevention of the tyranny of the majority and the dispersion of
centralized power. The framers of the Constitution achieved these objectives
not through the enunciation of any new principles but by compromising contending
tendencies and forces. The structure of the Constitution was like the structure
of a medieval cathedral in which counter-vailing forces were employed in such
a way as to hold the whole structure aloft. None of the great questions were
resolved: states rights, federal power, the tariff, slavery. American federalism,
which Acton reckoned one of the great inventions of the age, was based upon
compromise rather than principle. From the beginning this structure of republican
liberty threatened to collapse. In spite of their great achievement, Acton viewed
the work of the founders as incomplete and the Constitution as an imperfect
instrument.
It is my considered judgment that Acton was the most knowledgeable
foreign observer of American affairs in the nineteenth century. As a very young
man he had made a trip to the United States and had traveled widely, but the
mature Acton's knowledge of America was based upon books rather than direct
personal experience. No American, with the exception of Henry Adams who was
nearly his exact contemporary, knew American history more thoroughly than Acton.
It is a pity that American historians so rarely read him.
They do not read him, I am convinced, because Acton espoused
the Confederate cause in the Civil War, a struggle which Acton called "the
Second American Revolution." In May of 1861 Acton published an enormously
long essay in his journal, The Rambler, entitled, "Political Causes of
the American Revolution." The "American Revolution" is Acton's
designation for the Civil War. William Gladstone, later British prime minister,
read Acton's essay and it became the most determinative element in Gladstone's
thought toward the warring American States. Had not Charles Francis Adams, the
father of Henry Adams and U.S. Ambassador to the court of St. James, exerted
his diplomatic talents to the utmost, Gladstone would probably have secured
British intervention on the Confederate behalf.
Acton's reasons for his pro-Southern stance were well taken.
In 1860 the great federative polities of Europe and North America were all under
attack. Nationalism, centralization and bureaucratic administration were dissolving
and destroying the Germanic Confederation, the Austrian Empire, the patchwork
of Italian states and the United States of America. For Acton the retreat from
states' rights and federalism in the United States was the most important and
catastrophic of these developments.
In a letter to Robert E. Lee written in November of 1866 after
the surrender at Appomattox, Acton states clearly his reasons for his sympathy
for the Southern cause. He wrote the defeated Lee:
Without presuming to decide the purely legal question, on which it
seems evident to me from Madison's and Hamilton's papers that the Fathers of
the Constitution were not agreed, I saw in State Rights the only availing check
upon the absolutism of the sovereign will, and secession filled me with hope,
not as the destruction but as the redemption of Democracy. The institutions
of your Republic have not exercised on the old world the salutary and liberating
influence which ought to have belonged to them, by reason of those defects and
abuses of principle which the Confederate Constitution was expressly and wisely
calculated to remedy. I believed that the example of that great Reform would
have blessed all the races of mankind by establishing true freedom purged of
the native dangers and disorders of Republics. Therefore I believed that you
were fighting the battles of our liberty, our progress and our civilization;
and I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice
over that which was saved at Waterloo.
Let there be no mistake about it, Acton was no defender or
partisan of the institution of slavery. He abominated it as the very antithesis
of the freedom which he saw as the supreme value of historical development and
the very work of Providence. Still, Acton was no Northern abolitionist and he
saw slavery in the context of historical, religious and ethical development;
an institution rooted in the ideas and circumstances of a particular era in
time. It strikes one as odd that Acton, who was an ethical absolutist, should,
in the case of slavery, have been a moral relativist.
Perhaps Acton's attitudes were the consequence of a hierarchy
of values in which absolute freedom is the end and final value contingent upon
the possession of other values. Clearly the threat to freedom from centralized
governmental absolutism, the tyranny of the majority, bureaucratic administration,
democracy and socialism were all greater in Acton's estimate than the threat
to freedom from slavery in 1860. It is only in this light that Acton's ambivalent
attitudes toward slavery in the Southern States of the United States can be
explained. That Acton shared this view with many others in Europe and America
should not come as a surprise to us.
Was Acton mistaken? Were his political fears like his religious
fears in the First Vatican Council of 1869-1870 exaggerated and groundless?
The victory of centralization, governmental absolutism, the tyranny of the majority
and bureaucracy were less complete in 1865 than Acton imagined they would be.
Still, they remain the great threat to freedom in our own day and they have
grown in importance and power since Acton's day. Statism is no less inimical
to freedom than are democracy and socialism. We should not delude ourselves
that because socialism has been defeated the enemies of freedom have been routed.
In these matters Acton's concerns must prove to be our concerns.
In this brief discussion I have attempted to demonstrate that
Lord Acton's fascination with the United States provides us with an insight
into Acton's ethical and political philosophy. His concern with America was
not one concern among many in a wide-ranging and expansive intellectual natural
law and discerned by conscience. He believed this law higher than the power
of churches or states and he taught that the Providence of God progressively
enlarges human freedom and the ability to perform those acts which conscience
dictates. These are the essential concerns of any Republican regime, our own
included.
In 1889 in a review of James, Lord Bryce's The American Commonwealth
in the English Historical Review, Acton summed up the American accomplishment:
Those who deem Washington and Hamilton honest can apply the term to
few European statesmen. Their example presents a thorn, not a cushion, and threatens
all existing political forms, with the doubtful exception of the federal constitution
of 1874. It teaches that men ought to be in arms even against a remote and constructive
danger to their freedom; that even if the cloud is no bigger than a man's hand,
it is their right and their duty to stake the national existence, to sacrifice
lives and fortunes, to cover the country with a lake of blood, to shatter crowns
and sceptres and fling parliaments into the sea. On this principle of subversion
they erected their commonwealth, and by its virtue lifted the world out of its
orbit and assigned a new course to history. Here or nowhere we have the broken
chain, the rejected past, precedent and stature superseded by unwritten law,
sons wiser than their fathers, ideas rooted in the future, reason cutting as
clean as Atropos.
Stephen Tonsor is Professor Emeritus of History at the
University of Michigan. He is the author of Tradition and Reform in Education(Open
Court, 1974) and has published essays and reviews in such publications as Victorian
Studies, Journal of Modern History, The Catholic Historical Review, Modern Age,
and The Review of Politics.
Acton Institute for
the Study of Religion and Liberty
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